Are Venkys Past Point of No-return with Blackburn Rovers fans?

With relegation confirmed for Blackburn Rovers after a 11-year spell in the Premier League, their longest ever run in the top flight, in the post-war period, supporters, once again, turned their anger towards the owners, Venkys, and, manager, Steve Kean. As the dust begins to settle on the disastrous season, the mainstream media, for the first time, has taken an active interest in the on-goings at Ewood Park. Some of the “revelations” of the past few days have been well known to most of the supporters for the good part of the past 6 months. Nevertheless, with Steve Kean emphatically stating that “I’m here for the long term” as well as the owners being “100% right for the club” as well as how “these are exciting times for the club”, one has to wonder what happens next and whether Venkys are too out of touch with reality to be able to salvage the situation and stabilize a sinking ship.

If you ask any Rovers supporter whether there is anything Venkys can do to make them want to retain them as owners, the answer would be a resounding and instinctive “no”. However, if one approaches the situation as a realist, considering the fact that the ideal scenario of Venkys wanting to sell the club and potential buyers coming forward to make an acceptable offer to Venkys may not exist, supporters may have to reconsider the “no negotiation” stance that they rightfully hold. At this point, we want to present a “four-point plan” which is likely to “reset” the situation between owners and the supporters. The question, however, remains do the owners actually care what the fans think? And do they really want to make a success of their tenure? If the answers to those are yes, then they need to take a close look at the following, not for inspiration but for application.

1) Sack Steve Kean

Steve Kean undoubtedly has a poor results record in “management”, the primary criteria of judging a football manager. Whichever way he may want to spin the situation, the facts remain facts as highlighted as early as December 2011. Kean is, without a shadow of a doubt, beyond the point of no return with supporters and its not purely down to results on the pitch. His handling of the media, dubious transfers and team selection, the lack of acknowledgement of Rovers plight, and what fans see as a disrespect to their existence and views, combined with the circumstances within which he got the job in the first place, as well the “unsackable” tag which has been given to him have not made Kean a popular man. Whilst Kean survived the first wave of criticism which hit their peak during December 2011, the national media failed to look too closely at the facts, and Rovers supporters decided to “back off” in the interest of supporting the side in the most complete fashion. Instead of acknowledging that, Kean came out with ludicrous statements such as one where he said he receives “500 letters of support from fans everyday”. This time around, on the back of relegation, the national media is no longer as negligent and Rovers are under the microscope and so is Kean. Venkys should have sacked their man by now, but they must not waste another second in doing so and that is the first step towards “salvation”.

Not a smiling matter. Rovers have been relegated under the stewardship of Steve Kean, breaking many unwanted records during the 2011/12 season

2) Acknowledge their Mistakes

Even before replacing the manager, Venkys must come out and finally communicate with the fans in a transparent and honest fashion. The whole footballing world is aware of Rovers plight and it is clear that the decisions that the owners have taken in the last 18 months have resulted in relegation. Yes, the owners are new to football and they have made mistakes, but if “no one is to blame” as Venkatesh Rao states during a telephone interview with Indian media only a few days after relegation, then Venkys are delusional. There is enough blame to go around and the owners need to acknowledge that before they continue promising success and achievement for the future, something which they have been doing, foolishly, from day one.

3) Hire an Experienced and Popular Manager

The title says it all. At this point, Venkys need to think long and hard about the next manager. Not only must he be the right choice from a footballing perspective but he must also be “popular” enough with the fan-base in order to quell the frustration, worries and apathy which Venkys and Kean have instilled onto the fans. Supporters have lost faith and have spoken with their feet. Approximately 3,000 fewer fans were attending home games from just before the end of December, compared to after it. That is a crushing blow to the owners, even though they do not seem to understand its implications yet. More fans are expected to “walk away” by the time the upcoming season begins largely of the post-relegation fiasco including Kean’s unbelievable press conference for the Chelsea game. Names like Avram Grant and Dave Jones, who has an SEM link are simply not going to work. The new manager must bring the fans together and there must be no inkling of controversy around his appointment. Alan Curbishley, a tandem of Graeme Souness with club legend Tugay, as well as Mick McCarthy may all have the experience, personality and character to get supporters “on-side” and would all be available for work. However, it would be a valid question as to who in their right minds would work for Venkys with the way they have been running the club, and that leads us to the next point.

One of the logical choices for appointment as manager is former Charlton and West Ham manager Alan Curbishley who will need to be convinced of changes

4) Bring in the Professionals to Take Care of Business

This measure is on par with sacking Kean as manager in terms of its revitalizing effect and importance. Venkys must approach to re-hire John Williams and Tom Finn. Whilst it is unclear whether both men would be interested to return to Rovers in the first place, the Indians need to make it clear to them that they will have carte blanche in re-stabilizing the club and will have no interference from Pune. A communication line will be re-established with supporters, the media, and the owners and the club can be run the way any good club is supposed to be run. They will be popular appointments with the fans and bring back a feeling of familiarity as well as stability to Ewood Park. The playing staff will also be relieved and question marks over the “running of the club” would be quashed immediately just with their presence. Venkys will gain a sense of legitimacy in the process too. People can accept mistakes, but to repeat the same mistakes and to be oblivious to your responsibilities would be a fatal error on the part of the owners.

SOS needs to be sent to former Chairman John Williams and every step undertaken by Venkys to ensure his return to club

With a critical summer coming up for Blackburn Rovers, the right decisions need to be taken on who to sell, who to retain and who to buy in order to best position the club for the upcoming campaign. Williams and Finn have the background, experience and know-how to undertake those tasks as smoothly as possible whilst having as blind a support from fans as possible, in the process. With them at the helm there will be no question of vested interests over transfers either.

Concluding Thoughts

Blackburn Rovers is currently in the doldrums. Steve Kean and Venkys may not want to acknowledge it and may be promising “exciting times ahead” but delusions such as those do nothing but to infuriate an already tortured fan-base. In an ideal scenario, the owners would decide to sell the club. However, Venkys have been adamant that they would not consider a sale. If they are serious about that and they are serious about getting it right as they have been telling many people in recent months, then the time for change and action is here and now. The four point plan presented here does not guarantee success on the pitch. But it does promise to unify the fan-base and get people to focus on matters on the field instead of distractions, largely caused by mistakes undertaken by Venkys, during the past 18 months. It would also give Venkys as close a clean slate as possible with many fans, even though it may be a case of “forgive but not forget”. Digressing from any of those four points would negate the plan. This is emphatically true in terms of sacking Kean and approaching John Williams and Tom Finn. If one was a betting man, based on Venkys prior history at Rovers, you’d have to think that they would not go through with such a plan, but if they thought long and hard about it and found that their goals match those highlighted initially in this piece, then they’d be foolish not to. As much as they are the actual owners, supporters see Venkys as custodians, because after all, in their eyes, this is the club that Jack Walker built.

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Watch The Throne: Barça’s New Guardi-an

Disclaimer: I really don’t know what will happen next season. Tito Vilanova’s reign at Barcelona might end in utter disaster after a 5-0 defeat to Real Madrid in the first Clasico of the season and Sandro Rosell’s supposed dream might come true and “Big Phil” Scolari will take over on an interim basis until Muricy Ramalho becomes Barça coach in 2013, bringing in Neymar and Paulo Ganso as key signings, as Big Phil moves upstairs as Sporting Director. It might also end at the other end of the spectrum and Tito may become even more successful than Pep Guardiola ever was, if “bettering” his era is even remotely possible. This article is not a prophecy or prediction, but will try to objectively analyze why Tito Vilanova was appointed over candidates such as Ernesto Valverde or André Villas-Boas in a decision that no one, other than Pep, Andoni Zubizaretta and Rosell, knew about. 

FC Barcelona took an extraordinary decision this week to replace their most successful coach in history with Tito Vilanova, someone who hasn’t coached a top division club anywhere ever. The decision is further surprising because it was stated, in the Spanish press, that one of the reasons pushing Guardiola to resign at the end of the season was Vilanova’s health. Tito had a tumor removed from his mouth and therefore his health was always a lingering issue over the season. As an example, he couldn’t join the team on their trip to Japan for the Club World Cup. However, looking towards the challenges ahead, which Barcelona face in replacing Pep Guardiola whilst maintaining their winning and convincing* form of the previous years, this decision makes more sense.

There are 3 pillars to Barcelona’s success over the short and long term future:

1) Make sure Lionel Messi stays happy

After the Champions League Final in 2011, Guardiola was asked about how Barcelona can continue their success and maintain Messi’s excellence. His answer was short and precise, “make sure he is happy”. Messi might be a genius, arguably the best player over the past 20 years, one of the all time greats and deserving of all the plaudits you read every week. However, Messi is also a “difficult” character. The difficulty comes from him being a very introverted person, who does not speak too much and his silence, not from his motivation for football or anything specific in particular. If Messi doesn’t feel well mentally, or he is not happy, or is frustrated as evident once in a while on the pitch, he won’t perform. There have been actions taken by the club in order to make Messi happy. Signing Javier Mascherano and the contract extension given to Gaby Milito are two clear examples, but the signings of his old friends Gerard Pique and Cesc Fabregas might have also been motivated by keeping Messi happy. Whoever was going to replace Guardiola would have needed to understand Messi and make sure he can get the maximum out of him. There might just be no one better to do this than the guy who knows him longest, the guy who coached him(as well as Cesc and Pique) when he was 14 years old and the person who was first to know about Messi’s goalscoring abilities. Maybe both Valverde and Villas-Boas would have been able to get along with Messi as well, but there’s almost a guarantee that Messi won’t have problems with Tito Vilanova.

Messi, Cesc and Pique, during their time under Tito Vilanova, as youngsters

2) Make sure success-ion and the La Masia philosophy continues

A lot of key players at Barça are coming into the twilight of their career, notably Puyol and Xavi. A couple of players are entering the best years of their career, Fabregas and Pique being the examples. There’s also a great generation of Masia “products” coming through the ranks or already there, notably Thiago Alcantara, Marc Muniesa, Marc Bartra and Sergi Roberto. The idea of succession, bringing up players through the ranks, as well as the idea that the current playing philosophy the team upholds continue are key to the future success of the brand/sect/club called FC Barcelona. It’s arguable whether this is good or bad. Some might have the idea that football needs new influences and not altering your formula and relying too much on similar players is a mistake. However, this would ignore the fact that all of the players coming through from La Masia are different in one way or another. Sergi Roberto, for instance, is not the next Xavi or Fabregas, as he plays much more direct, is more a threat from the second line and prefers to move with the ball at his feet more than in any other way. If we take the recent examples of wingers coming through the ranks, Tello is not Cuenca and neither of them is Pedro, but they are all different players with different characteristics. The key to a successful La Masia policy is to know the players coming through, their characteristics as well as the needs of the first team squad in terms of which type of player should be integrated in order to add something new and different.

The La Masia policy wouldn’t work and make sense if Barcelona would allow players without the necessary quality to play just because they are from the youth ranks. It would put the whole policy in jeopardy. Instead, the key is to know which players have the necessary quality and which positions need to be filled from outside. That will only work with a coach who works for the long-term even, over the short-term period (as all coaching periods are these days), and who knows the youth teams well. While AVB seemed to know the Barcelona youth teams too, as his signing of Oriol Romeu suggests, he might have given up long-term interest over the short-term future of the club and went for the easy way, especially given the fact that he was burned once by following the alternative during his experience at Chelsea.

Young Tito and Young Pep in their early La Masia days

Finally, in Cesc and Pique, there are two players who are the natural successors of Puyol and Xavi both on and off the pitch, despite having different characteristics, again both on and off the field. With Cesc and Pique, the key will be to involve them more in the squad and simply load more responsibility onto them. Pique might be seen as some kind of rich celebrity party boy, but his passion for the club, his position as a team leader and his competitiveness are also beyond any doubt. Again, maybe the best idea would be to make sure the guy who knows La Masia and La Masia graduates best do the job.

3) Keep Guardiola at the club

How do you keep Pep at the club without him actually being at the club? You could replace him with his footballing twin brother. Guardiola and Vilanova share the same footballing ideas and philosophy, with the main difference being Vilanova seems more calm and relaxed. Guardiola is the Barcelona player who has been sent off more than any other other but not because of tackles but rather largely for arguing with referees and getting sent off for dissent. Vilanova, as his interviews, behavior and body language suggest, is much calmer than Pep, except maybe when he faces Jose Mourinho’s finger. This might have been a problem if Barcelona players needed motivation or a strong hand to accept the leadership of the coach, but remember that they have already been convinced and converted to the “Barcelona belief” by Pep. Tito doesn’t need to do anything in that respect, but what he needs to do is to guide the ship and keep the footballing ideas of Pep alive. In theory, he should have very little of the usual problems assistant managers have when they need to replace the first team coach with regards to respect and authority. So again, Vilanova, more than anyone else, makes sense in terms of an appointment. Furthermore, since he appears to be a much more calm and collected person, maybe that’s exactly the Guardiola version the team now needs. Maybe the players would do well with a manager who keeps the tactical and ideological approach but is a bit less tense, which Guardiola was, especially over the 2011/12 season.

Tito and Pep preside over their success in their treble-winning season (Picture by Miguel Ruiz for FCB)

With all that said, success for Vilanova is far from guaranteed, failure might lead to an implosion and Barcelona returning to their turn of the century self or even worse, to the eighties era. One should be aware that Barça is a snakes-pit with lots of vested interests by different groups and while battling a Madrid empire with all their media power is already difficult and tiresome, Barcelona has its fair share of internal strife and enemies through different political groups, such as Group Godo, a powerful media group in Catalonia, who have their own interests to follow and want their share of the power. Guardiola not only had to fight Madrid and the Madrid press, who he called “Central Lechera”, but he also had enough internal enemies in Catalonia, people who, during his time as a player, came up with rumors about his sexuality and ran stories about him being HIV positive. Tito Vilanova has a huge task coming up and it’s far from easy. However, he can be sure of the support of his Sporting Director and the whole squad. He is assured the moral support of Pep and he knows himself that he doesn’t have to change too much from the current squad and that no one expects radical changes as a tool to cement his own legacy, something Villas-Boas tried to do and failed at. After all, Tito is Pep’s twin brother and no one expects him to be anyone else.

*As they say in Spain, it’s not only about winning(vencer) but convincing(convencer) people of your superiority and style. For Barcelona, the second has always been as important as the first, as there is no winning without convincing. This might also have been the explanation as to why the Madrid press and Real Madrid are particularly hostile over recent years towards Barcelona and run ridiculous amounts of conspiracy theories.

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Further reading:

In general, Marti Perarnau is not only one of the best Spanish journalists, but also the best source anywhere with regards to information about Barcelona. His article on Cesc and why his signing was done can be found here(although only in Spanish). It’s highly recommended to visit his blog, also only in Spanish.

A good article by Simon Kuper on some tactical aspects of Barcelona

An old article by Pep Guardiola in El Pais from 2007 that was only about a cup game in a lousy season but that explains the importance of “feeling” and knowing the history and what to play for

Jonathan Wilson on why great teams come to an end for the Guardian

Parachuting into Defence: The Busquets Role

Football is in an era where live television, Internet and, most recently, social media coverage mean that virtually everything is covered from all angles. There is a school of thought that there are no more surprises in the world of football, especially when it comes to tactics. The World Cup used to be place where managers pitted wits against each other and displayed tactical “evolutions” which would go on to trickle down towards club football until the next show-and-tell four years later. Each country brought a bit of what they’d been undertaking domestically over recent years and displayed it in front of world cameras. Had there been similar coverage to what we have today then the impact of the “Mighty Magyars” tactical performance against England at Wembley in 1953 would’ve been diminished as it would have been noted earlier. The WM, the Ajax model, the libero, the 4-2-3-1, the “Makelele role” and the “false 9″ provide a range of tactical cornerstones and innovations in the history of football. Now, we’ve been introduced to what can, and very well should, be another cornerstone. We’re going to call it “the Busquets role”.

In 2009, Jonathan Wilson, author of Inverting the Pyramid: A History of Football Tactics, spoke about the potential return of the sweeper in modern football. Whilst taking that argument as a basis, renowned tactical expert Michael Cox, of Zonalmarking, stated that due to the popularity of one-striker formations, the modern “sweeper” may not be the spare man pushing up into midfield leaving a 1 vs 1 situation, but rather a defensive midfielder dropping into defence. This would effectively split the central defenders as the said player slots into the middle, whilst the “full backs” already starting a little further ahead than their central defensive colleagues, would have further license to bombard forward. At the time, Cox theorized that a crucial aspect of Pep Guardiola’s tactical success in overloading the midfield, pressing his opponents and keeping possession, had seen Sergio Busquets, the defensive midfielder, drop into defence, pushing up Eric Abidal and especially Dani Alves into extremely advanced positions. This allowed Busquets to drop into space, dictate possession and spray the ball across from the back. His performances and role for Barcelona are often overlooked by people with less of an eye for the smallest details defining success. Cox labelled Busquets role as a traditional “center half”, a term used to describe a player dropping into central defence from midfield, before it was falsely mirrored, largely by British “pundits”, to reflect a center back.

Barcelona's "4-3-3" on paper and how it really plays. Sergio Busquets (16), Eric Abidal (21) and Dani Alves (2) circled as movement crucial to shape. Rest of starting line-up can be followed according to numbers from first diagram. Match vs Athletic Bilbao played on March 31, 2012

Whilst on paper Barcelona may line up 4-3-3, in practice it has become much harder to decipher their formation. However, by using an analysis of average positions, it is safer to call their formation a 3-4-3 (if not a 2-1-4-3) system with Busquets as the traditional center half between two central defenders. As a consequence, both full backs are able to play the role of wide midfielders and sometimes even wingers. Sometimes, if Guardiola picks Puyol, Pique and Mascherano as 3 members of the “back four” in defence, the remaining full back, likely to be Dani Alves, pushes up to a winger’s role, whilst Busquets holds his ground next to a more disciplined midfielder such as Seydou Keita, effectively forming a belt of three as a second line in front of the back three. Barcelona used this shape against Milan in the Champions League Quarter Final First Leg, where they virtually lined up as a 3-3-3-1. In this instance, Busquets continues to provide cover but not necessarily as the “center half” which he usually does. Incidentally, its the presence of Javier Mascherano, a natural defensive midfielder, in central defence, which frees up Busquets and gives the tactical flexibility to Barcelona. In either shape, Barcelona are able to free up their wide players and provide adequate cover in defence too. Only Xavi and Dani Alves pass the ball more per game than Sergio Busquets does from his center half position.

Sergio Busquets' heat map signifies the different roles he plays when Barcelona utilize him as a "center half" as against Athletic Bilbao (31/3/2012) and when they play with a more orthodox back-3 of Puyol, Pique and Mascherano with Busquets in central midfield. In the former, he has far more defensive duties and his heat map reflects that. In the latter, he has a freer role which allows him to advance further forward whilst minimizing his defensive duties as Barcelona already have a "third man" cover at the back. The letter "D" represents the goal Barcelona are defending

Marcelo Bielsa’s Athletic Bilbao has played some of the best football in Europe this season. Even though they are on the verge of making it two cup final appearances for the season, the lack of depth in the squad has meant Athletic has not been able to fight on three fronts, without hampering their league form. Nevertheless, one of the cornerstones of their play has been the placement of Javi Martinez, arguably a world class central midfielder, in central defence, probably more a la Mascherano than Busquets, but still worth a mention. Can we classify him as a center half?

Interestingly, whilst, on paper, Athletic have largely set up as 4-3-3 this season, in reality, they play a 3-4-3 (or 2-1-4-3 to be precise) similar to Barcelona in many ways. Javi Martinez plays at center back but the “center half” role is largely filled by Ander Iturraspe, who drops in from central midfield. Javi Martinez plays as more of a conventional center back with passing ability, an added bonus. His reading of the game and athleticism like Mascherano’s has allowed him to fit in at the back rather effortlessly. The end result is the same, as Iturraspe’s presence allows Aurtenexte and Iraola to bombard forward with the “right back” effectively playing as a winger. However, the consequence of playing someone with Javi Martinez’s passing ability in defence is that he is able to dictate play from deep. He averages over 50 passes a match and touches the ball more than any other Athletic player. Furthermore, the space and time that he has on the ball helps him to confirm his accuracy, where once again he leads his teammates. Just to illustrate the difference it has made to his game as opposed to the past when he has played in central midfield, his passing accuracy is up by 10% whilst he is averaging 20 more passes a game compared to his performances last season. It must be stated that Bielsa’s Bilbao side implement a much more passing game as opposed to the more direct approach of last season, however, Javi Martinez’s coming of age as an individual in his new role must not be downplayed either.

In the first diagram, Athletic's average positions, as opposed to the "4-3-3" reported on paper, are depicted. The shape closely signifies how Barcelona set up. Aurtenexte (3), Iturraspe (8) and Iraola (15) are circled. Other starting XI players include numbers (5), (24 Javi Martinez) in defence, (10) and (21) in central midfield and (19), (9) and (14). This is a typical Athletic set-up from this season, taken from the match vs Sporting on March 25, 2012. The second picture represents Iturraspe's heat map. Again this closely represents areas/positions a center half moves into, just as we've previously seen with Busquets.

For Mascherano, whilst he can’t expect to be the biggest passer of the ball at Barcelona, he does average 20 and 25 passes a game higher than Pique and Puyol, the other regular center backs, respectively, and that is another significant statistic. He may have been labelled as someone who can’t “pass the Barcelona way” after joining them from Liverpool, but the faith that Guardiola has kept in him is reciprocated by his performances, even from a passing perspective. One positive of playing players such as Javi Martinez and Mascherano in orthodox central defensive roles is that their reading of the game and intelligence from midfield is translated to higher interceptions and successful tackles than anyone else in their respective squads, hence winning the ball back and getting on it far more than other counterparts. The bottom line is their passing statistic. But as its clear, there is a whole chain of thought, by their managers, and events that lead one there.

The Busquets experimented has been exported abroad too. In Serie A, Roma’s Luis Enrique, with obvious strong influences from Barcelona, has sought to play an attacking 4-3-3 formation. Pressured to include Francesco Totti, Luis Enrique has varied his 4-3-3 somewhat resembling a diamond-shape in the middle with Totti or at times Erik Lamela, dropping behind two strikers at the top end. At the other end, Danielle De Rossi has played in the Busquets role dropping in between the two center backs, Juan and Simon Kjaer, and dictated play from deep. His reading of the game has been vital in allowing further risks to be taken by Roma’s players in advancing forward. Whilst results have been mixed, the same cannot be said of De Rossi’s performances. Arguably, Roma’s best and most consistent performer this season, he also leads them in passes, interceptions and is amongst their best tacklers. He also plays 1 key pass per game (WhoScored), which is impressive for someone who is playing so deep. According to James Horncastle, a leading European football writer and expert in Italian football, the Busquets role is labelled the “Parachute” in Italy. Horncastle states that, according to De Rossi himself, Luis Enrique gave him tapes of Oriel Romeu and not Busquets when explaining the role to the Italian. Horncastle added “De Rossi plays this role. Its the keystone of Roma’s play under Luis Enrique. Without it, they are a different side”.

Luis Enrique's Roma during three different matches this season. Against Novara on April 1, 2012, Danielle De Rossi (16) plays as a left-sided center back, with Gago (19) attempting to play in De Rossi's center half role. Jose Angel (3) and Rodrigo Taddei (11) provide width. The shape resembles a 2-3-2-2-1 and is a bit imbalanced. Roma won 5-2. In the second picture, from a game versus Genoa a week earlier, they play a 2-1-4-2-1 (as close to a Barcelona 3-4-3 or 2-1-4-3 as possible). De Rossi reverts to center half with Lamela (8) playing the Messi role. There is more balance in midfield and Roma win 1-0. In the final picture, Roma perfect the system against Inter in February. The center backs are split wider allowing De Rossi to slot in perfectly. The midfield is more balanced and the shape is a 2-1-4-3 with starters including (5), (4) in defence, De Rossi at center half, Jose Angel and Taddei wide, (15) and (19) in central midfield and (31), (10) and (8) the threesome up front. Roma won 4-0.

Interestingly, De Rossi has also played as a center back on a couple of occasions, against Juventus in December, as well as Novara this past weekend. Whilst he performed admirably against Juventus and scored a goal, he was less influential in terms of dictating play. Nevertheless, Roma looked more solid and drew 1-1 at home. He averaged between 25 and 35 fewer passes compared to his season average on both occasions of playing in central defence. Nevertheless, it allows Roma to take extra attacking liberties. They virtually played as a 2-3-3-1-1 against Novara. However, the inability of Fernando Gago to provide better defensive cover a la Busquets or even Iturraspe means that Roma will not benefit by playing Danielle De Rossi in central defence as much as they potentially could. This is further confirmed by the influence that he holds by playing in the Parachute for Roma. As much as Luis Enrique has tried to bring in the Barcelona-system (2-1-4-3), he has been let down largely due to the parts (players) not fitting the system as quickly as he would have hoped.

De Rossi's heat map as a left sided central defender and as a center half in two different games this season.

When you implement the Busquets role, you will need two attacking full backs who are able to provide width as well as undertake their fair share of defending as a prerequisite. Adriano, Dani Alves and Andoni Iraola fulfill those duties for their respective clubs. Luis Enrique has been unable to nail down the right players for those roles. Jose Angel and Aleandro Rosi, whilst talented, have needed time to adapt to their roles, whilst Rodrigo Taddei has been converted to a full back this season and has not been able to produce an acceptable transition back to defence yet. Nevertheless, De Rossi’s role and performances has never been in question. When in full flow and everything falling into place, De Rossi’s performances in between the two central defenders provides both cover as well as passing tempo, setting every attack into motion. One such example was when Roma played Inter Milan in February and came out 4-0 winners. De Rossi dominated the game on both fronts, whilst the Roma shape and flow was as disciplined as it was beautiful. De Rossi made 99 passes, the most on the pitch, and the team kept the right width, shape and positions on the field, perfectly illustrating a 3-4-3 (2-1-4-3) formation, as it should be.

In the forum of tactical “innovation”, managers are always looking for ways to gain an advantage over the opposition. This has led to the reincarnation of the center half. The benefits of having a center half in front of the defence instead of a traditional destroyer, anchor or even an Andrea Pirlo-esque deep-lying playmaker is that in many ways it blends facets of those roles into one. This allows more attacking full backs (and in some ways requires them more than allows for them), as well as the ability to flood the midfield and dominate possession with up to seven players (usually in a 2-1-4-3 shape) outnumbering the opposition. Spain has been the setting for the most experiments when it comes to the re-emergence of the role, as well as other variants of the re-inventing traditional midfielders. We’ve talked about Busquets and Iturraspe as well as Mascherano and Javi Martinez who have been turned into ball-playing center backs. It is no coincidence that Guardiola and Bielsa share similar values and visions on football. In Italy, Luis Enrique has done the same with Danielle De Rossi. He has played in both the Busquets role, or Parachute as it is referred to in Italy, as well as at times in the Mascherano one. His influence and performances have never been better throughout his career. Roberto Guana of Cesena has also played as the Parachute this season. However, as we’ve found out in order to get the best out of playing a center half, the set up, shape, and movement must follow suit too. Otherwise, one man may shine more than the team does, which would be, ultimately, fruitless in the pursuit of success. The English Premier League, Bundesliga and Ligue 1 have yet to delve into experimenting with such a role but if one had to pick a player who the role would fit like a glove then Rennes Yann M’Vila would be that player. His intelligence, reading of the game and passing ability provide him with all the necessary ingredients to benefit his next club side. Food for thought for a club like Arsenal.

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I would like to thank ESPN Soccernet’s GAMECAST services for providing key in-game diagrams that were used during the analysis above. With special thanks to work previously done by Jonathan Wilson and Michael Cox of Zonal Marking as well as conversations held with James Horncastle.

Jack Walker’s Legacy: The Blackburn Rovers Academy

When Jack Walker officially took over Blackburn Rovers in January 1991, even the most day-dreaming of supporters could not have foreshadowed what lay ahead for the club. Threatened with relegation from the old Second Division (equivalent to Championship) at the time, the club would become champions of the English Premier League in fours years. Walker restructured Ewood Park, building the Jack Walker Stand, spending approximately £20 million to do so. Money was no issue, for a period at the club, with some of the best of British talents joining the club, from manager Kenny Dalglish to Alan Shearer, Chris Sutton, David Batty, Graeme Le Saux, and Tim Sherwood among others. Supporters have had to endure taunts of having “bought” the Premier League title, even though the club spent just under £2 million more than second place Manchester United in assembling its squad. In fact, Manchester United spent more money on transfers that season than Rovers had. Uncle Jack, as he is affectionately known, would also invest in the town of Blackburn and is regarded as a hero within the community as much as within the football club.

Walker watched tearfully as his beloved Rovers side confirmed its relegation with a 0-0 draw at Ewood Park against Manchester United near the end of the 1998/99 season. He wouldn’t live to see Rovers gain promotion as he passed away, aged 71, at the start of their promotion campaign of 2000/01. Two of the players that played a key role in getting Rovers back to the Premier League had been David Dunn, still at the club today, having returned from a spell at Birmingham City, and Damien Duff, now at Fulham. Marlon Broomes, Martin Taylor, Damien Johnson, and Jonathan Douglas all played some role during that season. All 6 players were products of the successful Academy. As was Jack Walker’s ultimate goal with Rovers, he wanted to make it a self-financing club in the long-term, mirroring the Manchester United youth development of the early-to-mid nineties. It was in 1996, that an official “youth structure” was put in place at the club, bringing in players such as Dunn and Duff into the system even before the current facilities existed. The class of Dunn and Duff was losing finalists in the FA Youth Cup in 1998. However, it would be a few months after Jack Walker’s passing that his brainchild, the Academy would be inaugurated.

The Blackburn Rovers Academy at night

The Brockhall Village Academy, opened in 2001, cost approximately £4.75 million as state of the art facilities on par with top training facilities anywhere in Europe. It includes 6 full-size pitches, indoor training facilities, indoor running track, outdoor running “hill”, a swimming pool, goalkeeper training facilities as well as accommodation for the youth players. In the 2001 FA Youth Cup, Rovers would be losing finalists again. In terms of league activity, the Rovers youth side won the U-17 Premier Academy League in the 1998/1999 and the U-19 Premier Academy League in 2002/3 before the U-19 and U-17 leagues were merged to form the U-18 Academy Premier League in 2004/5, when Rovers won the inaugural edition. In fact, when it comes to a roll of honor in the Premier Academy League, Blackburn Rovers are the second most successful side after Arsenal, winning 3 leagues, compared to Arsenal’s 5. Rovers and Arsenal are the only ever sides to have won Academy Premier Leagues in all 3 age categories. Even West Ham’s heralded Youth Academy, has not tasted any glory, in the aftermath of producing the “Golden Generation” of 1998-2000, boasting the likes of Joe Cole, Michael Carrick and Frank Lampard, when they lifted 1 FA Youth Cup and back-to-back U-19 Academy Premier League titles.

The Academy indoor training pitch

In terms of coaching and managing the set-up, Bobby Downes, formerly involved with youth football at Aston Villa, Port Vale and Watford, where he was Director of Youth Football, under former England manager, Graham Taylor, was recruited in 1997 to a similar role at Rovers, eventually being the man responsible for running the Academy when it was officially set-up. The thinking ahead was important in terms of strategic planning from the club in the mid-1990′s, putting into place the tools necessary to maximize the output from the structure even before it may have physically been there. During his tenure, Downes oversaw numerous players from under his stewardship being promoted to the Rovers first team squad, some more permanently than others. They included Dunn, Duff, Martin Taylor, Jay McEveley, Paul Gallagher, Matt Derbyshire, Junior Hoilett, and Martin Olsson, who was recruited to the Academy at the age of 17 from Sweden in 2006. In some cases, even when certain players were deemed not good enough for the Rovers first team, they were sold off, usually to Championship clubs, and thus raised important revenue for the club. That list included players such as Damien Johnson, Ben Burgess, Neil Danns, Jemal Johnson, and Jonathan Douglas. Under his stewardship, Rovers youth excelled in competitive football as illustrated through their performances in both the Academy Premier League and FA Youth Cup. In the summer of 2009, whilst Sam Allardyce was manager, Bobby Downes left the club by mutual consent. Phil Cannon was recruited to become the new Academy Manager.

Cannon, boasting an impressive background in youth development, was previously Head of Youth Development at Swindon, where he oversaw the early development of Theo Walcott, but more recently was Head of Recruitment at Everton, who are widely regarded as running one of the best youth set-ups in the country, producing an endless array of players including Wayne Rooney, Francis Jeffers, Leon Osman, Jack Rodwell and most recently Ross Barkley among others. Cannon, interviewed at the time of hiring, by the official Rovers website stated, “If that first team was full of local boys, it would be fantastic because they are playing for ‘their’ team. I think the locals can identify more with them and I think the local boys do try a little bit harder”. Since then, Phil Jones, Grant Hanley, Adam Henley, Josh Morris, Jason Lowe, and Nick Blackman have been promoted to the first team squad, with some such as Jones, Hanley and Lowe playing integral roles during the last couple of seasons. Obviously, some of the credit for their development still lay with the previous regime under Downes, nevertheless, the good work that the current staff including Cannon, Alan Miller as Head of Recruitment, David Lowe as Head of Youth Coaching, as well as team coaches for the U-18 and U-16 sides, Terry McPhillips, Simon Ireland and Tony Grant cannot go unnoticed.

Rovers youngsters celebrate beating Newcastle in the Quarter Finals of FA Youth Cup in February, 2012

The current edition of the Rovers youth set-up has seen the U-18 side make the semi-finals of the FA Youth Cup where they will play bitter rivals Burnley in a two-legged affair. Labelled by on-lookers as possibly the best batch of talent to come through Brockhall at once, a number of key players have alternated between Reserves League football and the Academy Premier League this season. Stand-out performers include the cream of the crop Hugo Fernandez, a young Spaniard, who only turned 18 earlier this year and can play anywhere along the middle of the pitch, from defence to an attacking midfield position. He has taken strides in his development this season as he has been given a more advanced role compared to his early times at the club. He has recently been making more regular appearances for the Reserves although still plays a crucial role at Academy level especially in the FA Youth Cup. John O’Sullivan is a young Irish midfielder who is comfortable across midfield and has played a few times for the Reserves this season too. He’s also been capped at U-19 level by Ireland. Jack O’Connell, a left sided defender comfortable at center back or left back was capped by the England U-18 side in March 2012. Robbie Cotton, long hailed as one of the best players that the Academy had produced, judging by the player’s potential, has been promoted to the first team squad this season, although he has yet to make an appearance for them. He is still involved in the FA Youth Cup and scored the winning penalty in a thrilling Quarter Final victory over Newcastle, and features regularly for Gary Bowyer’s Reserve side.

Rovers greatest supporter keeping an eye on his club from beyond

If Blackburn Rovers overcome Burnley, they would be a step closer to winning the FA Youth Cup for the first time since 1959, something that players such as Duff, Dunn, or Jones failed to do, as well as confirming their promise. Considering the club’s current fortunes on and off the pitch, it would not be beyond the scope of reality if some of the current Academy batch began featuring for the first team squad by next season. At the same time, the Blackburn Rovers Academy has helped fund itself and more-over through the transfer of players. All in all, just under £60m has been raised since 1994 through the transfer of players, an average of £3.3m a year. Some of the players have ended up winning Champions Leagues, Premier Leagues, and have gone on to play at World Cups and European Championships for their countries. Rovers hold 2 of the top 5 most expensive Academy transfers in English football history, with both Damien Duff and Phil Jones, who cost their future clubs a reported £17m each. Only Andy Carroll, Wayne Rooney, Rio Ferdinand and Owen Hargreaves (if you want to include cross-border transfers) have ever gained their respective academies more money. Considering the overall picture, coupled with Blackburn being a town in arguably the most hotly-contested catchment area for recruitment of youth players, with up to 30 clubs, in competing for youngsters in the North West, it becomes clear that the backbone of the Academy factory floor has been key in maintaining Blackburn Rovers position on and off the pitch in the Premier League, in what was Uncle Jack’s parting and, hopefully, eternal, gift to the club.

Honorable mentions for Shay Given who was signed by Blackburn Rovers as an 18 year old before progressing to the first team squad. He was transferred to Newcastle United shortly after. Anthony Pilkington of Norwich City was part of the Youth Academy but was let go of

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La Liga: What’s Changed in the Title Race this Season?

As we draw towards the tail end of the Spanish Primera División, Real Madrid continue to set the pace with what could be a record-breaking season. Leading their bitter rivals, Barcelona, by 8 points, they are on course to win their first title since 2007/8, and go on to record the most points ever made in a single La Liga season, as well as most away wins and overall goals. Looking at those stats, it is all the most impressive considering that Jose Mourinho’s Los Merengues are trailblazing at a time when experts are debating whether the current Barcelona side, under Pep Guardiola, is worthy of being considered the greatest club side ever on the back of their recent achievements.

If anyone claims to have the definitive answer as to why Barcelona trail Real Madrid by such a significant gap, they’re lying. With the smallest of margins deciding who wins what, it would be useful to look at a number of the “small marginal changes” that have occurred this season, in order to draw certain factual conclusions, without leaving room to speculation.

Possession and Tiki-Taka

That’s the name of the game for Barcelona. Its been a cornerstone of their success under Guardiola. They averaged just over 72% of the ball last season, but are currently averaging “only” 70% this time around. Yes, you read that right, only 70%! Whilst it may not seem like much, at the summit of the game the difference between great and perfect is slim, especially if it’s a backwards step. They’re currently averaging 68% possession away from home, which is 3.5% less than last season. In terms of pass success ratio, they’ve slightly dropped off to 89% from an incredible 90% success ratio.

Real Madrid, on the other hand, have increased their possession of the ball by 5% to 61%. Their pass accuracy has also increased to 85% from 83%. Whilst Barcelona’s slight drop-off may not seem significant, as they are having a “relatively” successful season in the league by most standards other than their own, in a league where “draws are the new defeats” the margins are tight. Real Madrid’s improvement is a sure sign towards becoming more dominant and ruthless.

Score Goals When They Matter

Last season, La Liga ended with Real Madrid losing the race by 4 points. They scored more goals than Barcelona to no avail. They even drew one less match than Barcelona had. However, the key statistic that cost Mourinho’s side was their failure to score goals in key moments. Simply put, Real Madrid failed to score in 6 out of their 38 matches. They drew 3 of those games and lost the other 3. In the tightest of leagues, the slightest margin counts big and despite Cristiano Ronaldo’s record-breaking 40 goals as well as the side scoring an amazing 102 goals, it proved costly. Barcelona only failed to score twice.

This season has seen Real Madrid become more ruthless in front of goal. After 26 rounds of games, they have only failed to score twice. In theory, they may fail to score in a number of games till the end of the season and that could very well cost them a title. Barcelona have failed to score in 3 matches, effectively 1 more time in 11 less matches. So it may not be as much about Barcelona’s failings as much as it is about Real Madrid rectifying one of their few “failings”.

A Game of Two Halves, or at least the Second Half

Barcelona are notoriously strong starters to matches. Turn on the TV 15 minutes late and its likely you have missed a goal or two. Last season, they were 8-0 (goals scored-goals conceded) during the first 15 minutes of matches, and they are just as dominant again this season with a 14-4 record in the early stages of games. In fact, Barcelona usually have matches sewn up by the end of the first half. They had a 42-8 record last season. This season, they have an identical first half record even though there are still 11 matches to go. That’s quite significantly different to Real Madrid who have been poor starters to matches, especially this season. They have an 8-6 record in the opening 15 minutes of games, even though, strikingly, they get stronger as the half goes on. Away from home, they’ve only conceded two goals in the first half of games all season long.

It’s in the second half of games where Barcelona have found trouble and Real Madrid have found extra gears. Barcelona have a relatively poor first 15 minutes of the second half with a 12-5 record, already conceding more goals during that period compared to the whole of last season. However, it’s the final 15 minutes of the game, away from home, when Barcelona are at their most vulnerable. They have an 11-8 record during that period. It may still be a “winning” record, but as stated numerous times before, in a league of fine margins the smallest elements can sway a title race. Last season, for instance, the champions had a 21-5 record away from home during the last 15 minutes. Real Madrid, on the other hand, perform even better in second halves of games. They have scored an amazing 53 goals in the second half, conceding only 13. Last season, they “only” scored 56 goals, whilst conceding 26. Even more impressive is the way Mourinho’s side close out matches. They have a 17-3 record in the last 15 minutes of matches, as opposed to the 21-9 accumulated through the whole of the previous campaign. Conceding so late against Malaga at home cost Real Madrid 2 valuable points, and the side will rue giving away a free-kick in a dangerous position in stoppage time.

Much credit must go to the mental strength that Mourinho has instilled into his players to keep on pushing until the final whistle. The levels of concentration they’ve kept has minimized individual errors late in games too. The hunger is also there to want more goals even when the game is won, a criticism which is sometimes, possibly unjustly, aimed at Barcelona.

Resilience

Speaking about mental strength and concentration, Mourinho has instilled a “never say die” attitude in his players giving them the belief that they can come back from any deficit. Guardiola’s side have been relatively lax at times this season. They have twice lost half-time leads to end up drawing. Real Madrid almost always win when leading at half time, with Malaga being the only side in 2 years to avoid defeat at full time, after trailing at half time. Going back to last season, Barcelona, drew once and lost once after leading at half time, winning the other 21 occasions. Real Madrid, once again in resilience in the image of their manager, converted all 21 half-time leads to victories.

Mourinho has instilled a never-say-die attitude in his players

Even more surprisingly is how a team reacts to going a goal down. In Barcelona’s case, not too well. They have only won twice after conceding the first goal, drawing two and losing a further two. Real Madrid, on the other hand, lost only once after conceding the first goal as they recovered to win 7 times. They have also won by a one-goal margin on 6 occasions this season. Winning by one-goal is their most common type of victory. This is not say that they Real Madrid do not go on to romp opponents too. They have won by a margin of 3 goals or more in 13 matches, virtually half of their current La Liga games.

The Players

Every Barcelona and Real Madrid comparison has a Messi/Cristiano Ronaldo comparison at some point. Its pointless. There is nothing to add to what has already been said. Both players post incredible numbers and performances match after match. When everything is so tight between the two clubs, it may come down to one or two other players standing out more or less than they have before. But when we’re talking about almost 30 international players, consistency is usually a key constant. But not always.

Last season, Karim Benzema was on the verge of being let go of. He was even compared to a cat by his manager. Mourinho said he was overweight. He said he didn’t work hard enough. Nevertheless, he did end up scoring 15 goals, but at a key point of the season, Mourinho preferred to not play with Benzema even in an injury crisis. Gonzalo Higuain had an injury hit season too. It was largely hit and miss, but he ended up scoring 10 league goals. Between them, they started 36 matches in La Liga, and scored “only” 25 goals. Its a goal scoring record good enough at almost every club but not at Real Madrid and not when the margins are so close.

This season, Benzema, having shed a few pounds, and Higuain have had a healthy competition. What is more striking is that Mourinho has gotten both of them motivated and willing to rotate, largely irrespective of performance, as they’ve both been in fine form. They have started 29 league games between each other and have scored more than a goal a game, with a total of 31, a record, had it been owned by only one of them, on par with Messrs Messi and Ronaldo. Whenever one has tailed off the other has been ready to come on and make an impact.

Why have one when you can have both? Benzema and Higuain key actors in Real Madrid's improvement this season

Similarly, Angel Di Maria, has had an excellent season, even though he has virtually missed half of it. Despite starting only 12 matches, he’s already matched his goal/assist record from last year. He’d scored 5 and laid off another 13 before his injury, compared to 6 goals and 11 assists in 29 starts last year. Once again, Mourinho has managed to get an extra something from a player who had been criticized for his diving, play-acting and inability to perform consistently. His injury has meant that Kaka has gotten an unexpected opportunity and even though he isn’t the same player he was at his peak, he’s looked very useful for Real Madrid. In fact, Mourinho has said he’s never seen Kaka work harder for any team. He’s pitched in with 5 goals and 6 assists in only 14 starts this season.

On the other side of the spectrum, Barcelona have suffered with numerous injuries this season. Long-term victims include David Villa, Ibrahim Afellay and now, most worryingly, Eric Abidal requires a liver transplant. Carles Puyol has not been fully fit either and that has pressured Guardiola into selectively picking him for games, a fact which has not helped the captain gain consistency or hit top form. Alexis Sanchez, one of the club’s big summer signings, has only started 13 times, pitching in with 8 goals and 3 assists. Had he been fit throughout the season, he would’ve made Villa’s injury feel less influential. Going back to Puyol’s injury problems, even though they are nothing new, the main difference compared to last season was that Gerard Pique had been largely playing at the top of his game.

Guardiola has faced an injury crisis this season

This season, though, Pique, has found himself at the center of huge criticism, due to his dip in form. A pre-season which was hampered by injury as well as questions about his concentration on the pitch have meant that Pique, more than anyone, has missed Puyol. Pique has started only 13 times this season (29 starts last season), less than half of all of Barcelona’s matches. Most of the time he has been out injured but on a few occasions, mostly recently, he has been kept out of the side, even when Puyol has not been available. His tackle, interception and clearance figures have all dropped compared to last season by 0.3, 0.7 and 1.2 per game respectively to stand at 1.4, 1.2 and 2.4 per game (WhoScored). Most strikingly he has made 24 less passes per game this season than last. Guardiola has been lucky to have Javier Mascherano step into central defence and perform so admirably. On performance, Mascherano is, arguably, in the La Liga Team of the Season. His figures, in contrast to Piques, stand at a 3.7 tackles (a league high for center backs), 3.7 interceptions and 2.2 clearances per game. Nevertheless, “losing” both Pique and Puyol this season has hurt Barcelona, and they have conceded more goals as a result. A further dip in form for Pedro has only been compensated by recent emergences of Isaac Cuenca and Cristian Tello, both ahead of schedule, as well as the goals which Cesc Fabregas has been scoring.

All in all, while Real Madrid have had players like Kaka and Callejon ready to step in for the likes of Di Maria without hampering the team’s performance, Barcelona have not been lucky through a series of injuries, as well as, what must be said, an over-rotation of some players by Guardiola for the first time. Burn-out after playing over 60 matches for 3 consecutive seasons may have finally caught up with them.

Concluding Remarks

It is difficult to pin-point exactly what has been the catalyst for the relative shift in the fortunes of both clubs domestically and one must be wary when drawing conclusions. Despite the so-called “crisis” for Guardiola’s side, they convincingly beat Real Madrid in La Liga, after going behind with an early goal, picked up the Supercopa de España over Real Madrid in August 2011, won the European Supercup, the World Club Cup and knocked Mourinho’s side out of the Copa del Rey, with what included another away win in Madrid. Whilst Real Madrid have looked “better” against Barcelona this season than previously, the end result has largely been the same. Other than a nervous final 15 minutes at Camp Nou in the return leg of the Copa del Rey, where Real Madrid looked the more likelier side to net a winner, Barcelona have enjoyed another season with the upper hand in head-to-head meetings. Nevertheless, the capital club have been the more consistent side in the league due to some of the reasons highlighted above.

We’ve looked at what has changed more than why it’s changed because that would require deeper analysis over a longer period of time, possibly in the post-Mourinho and post-Guardiola periods. Nevertheless, two of the key themes of this article have been words like “relative” and “margin”. In what is an historic period for La Liga, the smallest of margins can be the difference between success and failure as Real Madrid found out last season, whilst Barcelona are finding out, to their dismay, now.

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The Idiot’s Guide to UEFA Financial Fair Play: What Does it All Mean?

In 2009, UEFA with the strong personal campaigning of Michel Platini, agreed to get the ball rolling on Financial Fair Play (FFP), thus meaning that from this season onwards, it is effectively in motion. At its core, FFP establishes a set of parameters/criteria in monitoring European clubs in order to prevent them from “over-spending” and, as a consequence, threatening their own long-term survival. Reports had suggested that hundreds of European clubs were running in debts with a percentage in serious financial peril. Most recently, the perilous state of Glasgow Rangers has come to light. A large proportion of European club debts is attributed to clubs within England, Italy and Spain. It must be noted that French and German leagues have been running regulations similar to FFP for years and, hence, their clubs are in better financial shape than their counterparts in the other countries mentioned.

After numerous delays in implementing FFP, the current season is the beginning of the monitoring period from within which clubs will not be allowed to lose more than a certain amount per three-year period. With that said, it is still unclear to many as to what constitutes FFP, what is allowed under it, what is not, and what happens if clubs do not adhere to it. What we will try to do is to simplify everything through a question and answer analysis in order to dissect FFP to its basic core.

Question marks, such as those raised by Arsene Wenger, lay over how far UEFA would go in potentially punishing violators. Already and very significantly, Manchester City have signaled their acceptance that they may not be able to fulfill all regulations and pass the FFP’s first monitoring period review. The question remains over how UEFA deals with clubs such as Manchester City, and possibly Chelsea, who in all likelihood, may fail to fulfill UEFA’s criteria in gaining a license for European competition the first time around. Only time will tell.

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, Chairman of the Executive Board at Bayern Munich as well as Acting Chairman of the European Club Association representing European clubs after the dissolution of the G-14, is a strong proponent of FFP

What will UEFA Financial Fair Play do?
a) Monitor club finances ensuring that clubs do not lose more than a specific amount annually

b) Implement periods of monitoring (three years) to avoid single-season “one-off” events from distorting financial prospects

c) “Punish” violators of FFP

What must clubs do?

They need to ensure that they don’t make losses of more than €45m per three year period except for the first monitoring period which is over two seasons (2011/12 and 2012/13) and would impact over participation in 2014/15 European competitions. The “allowed” loss drops to €30m over three years from the 2015/16 season onwards (3rd season of FFP application).

However, clubs are only allowed to record this level of loss if owners are willing to “subsidize” losses above €5m by injecting equity, otherwise the maximum permitted loss is €5m for the first review period of 2011/12 and 2012/13. So in reality the level of losses “allowed” by UEFA is much lower than what is being widely reported. Although equity injection helps owners such as those at Chelsea and Manchester City to have a better chance of compliance with FFP. Complicated much?

Will all “expenses” under expenditure be monitored?

In a word, no. Any expenditure accumulated under developing or building new stadiums will not be recorded under FFP monitoring. Furthermore, any expenses made towards youth development and infrastructure or anything to do with the youth team will not contribute towards expenditure either

So what exactly is considered in terms of “expenditure”?

Only football-related expenses from transfer fees and salaries. Transfer fees would be “amortized” or divided evenly over the term of a player’s contract

What about in terms of income?

Almost everything will be part of the assessment of income. That means ticket sales, TV money, sponsorships, merchandising, player sales and prize money from competitions.

What are critics saying about FFP?

a) They are questioning whether smaller clubs will be able to compete with bigger clubs if clubs can only “spend what they make”

b) Wages for players contracts signed before June 2010 will not go across calculations for the 2011/12 break-even analysis. A one-season waiver has been given by UEFA for the first monitoring period and again this goes a long way to help clubs such as Chelsea who signed deals with Drogba, Terry, Cech, Cole, Lampard, Essien and Kalou, among others, before that deadline

c) Potential for bigger clubs to create “artificial” income from sponsorships/stadium rights from companies with vested interests from their owners. Manchester City’s stadium naming rights with Etihad Airways has recently come under the microscope. UEFA have yet to rule on its validity although they have stated “if we see clubs looking for loopholes, we will act”. UEFA have said they will ensure “Fair Value” is given to such deals

d) Effect of different tax rates across countries mean some clubs will be paying more/less gross than the net figure accounted for

e) Third-party ownership is “allowed” by FFP but the English Premier League out-laws it, thus disadvantaging English sides

f) Solidarity or “parachute” payments to lower league clubs are only made by the Premier League and Ligue 1. These payments will be accounted for in FFP as the Premier League continues to lobby UEFA to discount them

g) UEFA states that if there is a loss recorded in a review period but there is a “positive trend” and losses recorded for 2011/12 can be attributed partly to deals undertaken before June 2010, then the club may not be sanctioned

Has FFP effected club behavior already?

a) Italian clubs have, for the first time, negotiated a collective TV rights deal which gives bigger clubs a smaller share of the cake in the spirit of creating a more level playing field in Italian football. Spain’s La Liga remains the only major league which still negotiates individual TV rights and, as a consequence, creates a huge gulf between income raised by Barcelona and Real Madrid compared to other teams

b) Clubs can no longer afford to lose major players on Bosman free transfers, as signaled by Arsenal’s sale of Samir Nasri and Gael Clichy to Manchester City in the summer of 2011. Manchester United manager Sir Alex Ferguson admitted in March 2012 that even though they will let Dimitar Berbatov leave in the upcoming summer transfer window they will “sign a new contract” with him first in order to get a fee for him and not lose him on a Bosman transfer

c) Traditionally heavy spenders like Inter Milan and to an extent Chelsea have begun curbing their spending

Yet to be seen if clubs like Chelsea and Manchester City will be smiling after UEFA addresses their financial reviews under FFP

How will UEFA punish violators of FFP?

a) Give them a warning

b) Fine the club. Although this may seem like a chicken/egg conundrum when one thinks of it

c) Deduct points. This is likely to occur in the group stages of the Champions League and Europa League. Importantly, this measure was a new punishment proposed and ratified immediately at Nyon in an Executive Committee Meeting in January 2012

d) Disqualify the team from UEFA competition. Although this is a major step, it is difficult to see if UEFA will take this stance

e) Exclude the team from future UEFA competitions. Again, similar to above, it is difficult to see if UEFA will adhere to such a measure

f) UEFA will discuss three other potential punishments for violators at the Istanbul UEFA EXCO on March 20-21. They include the withholding of UEFA prize money for taking part in the Champions League and Europa League, preventing clubs from registering “new players” for UEFA competitions, as well as restricting the total number of players that clubs may register for UEFA competitions. UEFA have shelved the proposal to implement transfer bans on clubs after receiving legal advice suggesting that it would contravene the European Community’s Restraint of Trade regulations

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The Strongest League in Europe: Relationship between Spending and European Success

When it comes to debating which of Europe’s football leagues is the “best”, there is never likely to be widespread consensus. Supporters of clubs in each of Europe’s top leagues, especially in Spain, England and Italy will be advocates for their leagues. Supporters in Germany would argue back that theirs is the most competitive. Supporters in France may argue back that there’s is the most open league. A choice of words could tip the argument on its head. From best to strongest, to most competitive, to most entertaining, advocates of each league will be able to have their way one way or the other. We don’t want to get involved in a subjective discussion about the merits of each league.

For our purposes, we will establish that strength is largely, if not wholly, indicated through success. Let’s not lose sight of the fact that the most telling indicator, and, importantly, only time when “leagues” come up against each other is during European football, in either the UEFA Champions League or UEFA Europa League. Whilst, this may be subject to fluke or one-off results, over a period of years, a pattern or trend, which would be hard to dispute, would emerge. It is quite straightforward to highlight Europe’s “strongest” league through these parameters during respective eras of European football. That is not what we are trying to do, although, nevertheless it would, naturally, be highlighted during the course of the article.

Success does not necessarily begin and end with the lifting of the Champions League, but the overall performances of clubs in European competition. This season’s Champions League has seen critics of the Premier League highlight the plight of the English sides in Europe. Most people claim to have seen this coming for a few years. Others state that it is just a blip and things will be back to business as usual next season. However, in order to understand why there has been a fluctuation of “strength” in some of Europe’s top leagues, namely the Premier League, Serie A, La Liga, Bundesliga, Ligue 1 and the Eredivisie, we have looked at the relationship between spending and European performance since the 2002/3 season in order to draw potential conclusions or even parallels.

Spend the Money

Since the 2002/3 season, the English Premier League has been the biggest spending football league in the whole world let alone between the 6 leagues that we’ve analyzed. It has spent €6 billion, which is almost twice as much as the next biggest spenders, the Serie A. Needless to say, the Premier League has spent far more money than it has recouped in each of the seasons in question. La Liga and the Bundesliga are the other two leagues who have spent more than they’ve received each and every season during our analysis. Ligue 1 has made a profit in 6 of the 10 seasons at hand, whilst, the Eredivisie has made a loss only once, during the first season of the period. Serie A provides us with one of the most interesting patterns which we will go into further depth later during the article. It made significant profits between 2002/3 and 2004/5, coinciding with the period where superstars left Italy to play in Spain and England, as clubs faced financial constraints and bankruptcy, only to be hit with the Calciopoli scandal in 2006, which further damaged Italian football.

Some other interesting patterns that emerge include the Premier League’s increased spending season on season from 2002/3 until 2007/8, when it almost hit €1 billion. It then experienced back to back drops until a “resurrection”, during the 2010/11 season, was followed by another drop in spending during the current campaign. Another interesting development is that Serie A has out-spent La Liga during each of the past four seasons. Serie A and Ligue 1 are the only two leagues that did not experience their biggest spending seasons in 2007/8. The Italians broke their spending record during the current campaign.

The amount of money spent cannot illustrate, on its own, the pattern a league takes during a period of time. It would also be helpful to look at the “migration flows” into and out of the leagues in question. We’ve analyzed whether there was an influx or outflow of players during each season. Some of the telling points we’ve come across have included the fact that the Serie A has largely seen an outflow of players into other leagues, until the current season when it hit record numbers of bringing in players in a season. Serie A “bought” 231 more players than it transferred out of the league this season. This is the first time an influx has been in three digits in any of the leagues. What this demonstrates is that the Serie A has looked into making up for “lost time” as well as its previous dormant period by competing with the other big leagues for big players. It had seen more players leave than enter the league during the preceding 5 seasons. There is far more balance when it comes to the other leagues from season to season as visible from the table below.

Where the Money Goes

Having established which leagues have been spending the money during the last decade, as well as establishing the influx/outflow ratios during the said period, it may be pertinent to fill in the final piece of that picture by looking at where the money is going to as well as where the players are coming from.

The English Premier League, unsurprisingly, has a trade “deficit” with the other 5 leagues when it comes to dealing in transfers to and from. The intake from Spain to England is the most lucrative across Europe with the move across the Channel from France to the Premier League being the second most lucrative. La Liga follows in third place with its intake from the Premier League which comes in third in the overall table. The Italians love to shop in Spain, spending more in La Liga than anywhere else, but the Spaniards almost reciprocate that spending and the trade stands at parity. The Bundesliga’s favorite hunting ground is the Serie A whilst the Dutch-English and French-English provide the least balanced trade relationships.

In terms of numbers, more players move from Ligue 1 to the Premier League than through any other path. A close second is the players moving from Argentina to La Liga, followed by from Portugal to Spain.

Reap the Rewards?

When it comes to tasting consistent “success” in European football, the last decade has largely been dominated by English and Spanish clubs. The tables below highlight UEFA European co-efficient points per season as well as rankings from 2002/3 till the current, on-going, season. During that period, the Premier League has finished as the best performing “league” in European competition twice (and is currently leading this season too). It has only finished outside the top three once. It has bettered the other 5 leagues mentioned 4 times out of the previous 9 seasons, and may do so for a 5th time in 10 seasons by the end of the current campaign. La Liga has finished first twice and has never finished outside the top three. Its “golden period” during the past decade coincided with a time when Sevilla added its weight to Spain’s continental strength. The Bundesliga has cemented itself in the top four consistently over the past four seasons. Whilst Bayern Munich has been its notable representative in the Champions League, the strength in depth of Germany’s performance has largely been due to its clubs endeavors in the Europa League. This is a strong indicator of the competitive depth found within the Bundesliga.

The Bundesliga – Serie A clash, which eventually led to the Germans gaining a 4th Champions League spot at the expense of the Italians is as tight as ever. Serie A bettered the Bundesliga during the first five seasons, whilst the Bundesliga returned the favor during the previous five, including the current campaign. Effectively, this translates to mean that the Italians need to significantly improve their European performances especially in the Europa League where they have been especially dire if they are to loosen the German grip off that additional Champions League spot.

Number in Bold represents European lead. Number in Italic represents lead between 6 leagues despite not leading across Europe

Value for Money

The beauty about football, probably more so than most other sports, is that on any given day almost any side can beat another, despite un-level playing fields brought upon by spending power, transfer budgets and wages. Watching sides like Levante, Monchengladbach, Montpellier and Swansea impress everyone in their respective leagues this season is testament that you can “succeed” even if you have microscopically smaller budgets than other sides. However, when it comes to football at the highest level, in the Champions League and Europa League, this argument gets transferred onto a bigger “league” stage. The Dutch, for example, have done themselves proud when it comes to performing in Europe when one looks at the spending their sides do in comparison to the other leagues.

The table above is self-explanatory as it details how many points each nation’s clubs would have accrued on a per season basis compared to their spending pattern during that given campaign. The Dutch league consistently punches above its weight and considering its export nature is really performing as well as one could perceive it to. The Premier League spends the most for the amount of points it gets, whilst the Bundesliga does relatively well in terms of its points per Euro spent, spending almost one-third of what the Premier League has to spend per every point. Let’s not lose sight of the fact that whilst the Dutch get “value for money”, the highest points that they have attained in Europe was 12.00 during the 2004/5 campaign. The Bundesliga has out-scored that figure 4 times, Ligue 1 twice, and the Premier League has scored more points during each of the past 7 seasons, including the current incomplete campaign, despite having two major sides knocked out in the group stages of the Champions League already. La Liga has never scored less than 12.437 during any of the past 10 seasons whilst Serie A has out-scored the Eredivisie’s figure 4 times. That puts things into perspective, with the reality that whilst a league may perform well in terms of the resources they’ve spent, the “success ceiling” will be limited past a certain point.

Looking at it from another angle, the graph below looks at things from the perspective of how many million Euros have been spent, per co-efficient point, and may be easier to relate to. Only on three occasions has the Premier League spent less per point than another league. On each of those occasions, including the current campaign, it has been the Serie A that has spent more per point. In terms of consistency and value for money at the highest level, one must not look past La Liga. Whilst not necessarily spending the most, their sides performances have remained consistent over the past decade. Whilst the Premier League has never spent less than 30 million Euros per point, La Liga has only spent that figure only twice during that period.

Direct Correlation between Spending and Succeeding?

Having illuminated many aspects of the argument, it is time to look at a graph designed to illustrate the direct relationship between league spending and European performance by that nation’s clubs. Looking closely at the graph a few realities are realized. The horizontal axis demonstrates the amount of money in millions of Euros whilst the vertical one establishes the UEFA co-efficient points.

1) The most recognizable trend is that the English Premier League sides perform better in Europe as their league spending increases. In other words, performances are better when spending is higher. Their points move upwards and to the right almost without disruption. The consistency of this breaks on a couple of occasions but as stated previously, “one-off” results and performances may vary but the overall pattern/trend over 10 seasons validates our point. The Bundesliga follows a similar model to that of the EPL. Its best performances in Europe have correlated to its biggest spending seasons. However, with a clear cap in its spending, its sides have had limited success past a certain level. No German side has won a European trophy during the period in discussion.

2) Ligue 1 sides seem to perform better when their league has spent less money during the transfer windows. This could suggest that retaining their squads and maintaining continuity is more influential in France when it comes to performance. Serie A also follows a similar model and argument. Money certainly does not equate to success in these two leagues. Furthermore, it may also suggest that a lot of the transfers do not work out over a period of time for the teams and players may be re-transferred sooner than expected. Although, this would require deeper analysis.

3) La Liga falls somewhere in between the two models, probably closer to the Ligue 1/Serie A one. Again, retaining squads and creating “eras” aided La Liga sides during the past decade. Sevilla and Barcelona are two of their success stories during that time. Atletico Madrid, Valencia and Espanyol are three other sides that played in European finals during the past decade.

4) Annual expenditure of approximately 200 million Euros will largely restrict a league to collecting under 12 co-efficient points during the corresponding campaign.

Conclusions

If history is an indicator then a country’s performance in European club football plays a significant role in establishing the “strongest” league of different time periods. La Liga dominated during the 1960′s until English football took over in the late 1960′s for approximately a decade when the Bundesliga went to the fore. This lasted until the mid 1980′s when before a brief return of English football to the tip of European club football, it would be the Serie A, which would go on to dominate for over a decade, almost without interruption, until the early 2000′s. La Liga would then return to the top of the performance charts for the first time in forty years, until the Premier League got its heyday near the end of the decade. At the moment, the balance is poised between the Premier League and La Liga. Whilst we have just described overall European performances, it is clear that this closely correlates to people’s perception of the strongest football leagues during those eras as well.

Money has come to play a huge role in European football during the last twenty years. Serie A dominated continental competitions during the 1990′s when they spent more than they had. It came back to hurt the Italians and they have yet to recover from it, even though signs are there that as money and players begin to pour into Serie A again, Italian football may begin to play a more key role in continental competitions in the near future. The English Premier League has been the biggest spenders over the last decade, however, the level of success attained is probably less than what the kind of money should have warranted. As top English sides begin to stall in Europe this season, there is talk of spending sprees for Chelsea, Arsenal, Manchester United and Manchester City in the coming summer, but is there money to spend, with the Financial Fair Play rules coming into play next season? Considering the fact that the Premier League sides taste more success as they spend more, this could be an obstacle that may allow Italian football back into the equation and turn the two-way tussle between La Liga and the EPL into a three-way.

It is clear that league spending plays an integral role in bringing “relative” success for its clubs in continental competition. However, there are two important ceilings to consider. Firstly, unless a certain financial threshold is broken, thought to be approximately €200 million, it is difficult to surpass certain levels of “success”. However, at the same time, on the flip side, spending more and investing in players, will likely move a nation’s clubs only up to the next level in terms of “relative success”. Looking at the previous table, leagues that spent between €400 million and €600 million largely fell into a central zone gaining between 10 and 16 co-efficient points per season. Moving past that level depends on a number of other factors which seem to have been more prevalent in La Liga.

This could imply that a model which is a hybrid between continuity and transfer expenditure may be the best strategy in ensuring “further” success past a certain point. Squads are retained for a longer period in La Liga, as sporting directors play a key role in player recruitment. The transfer policy does not change from manager to manager, unlike what happens in the Premier League. There is more emphasis on coaching than management. There is a far more significant turn-over of players in the EPL than any of the other leagues discussed whilst their most successful sides during the past decade have been Manchester United and Chelsea, who, notably, retained a strong nucleus of the same players over a long period of time. As the EPL re-examines its financial prowess at the end of the season, it may be worthwhile for the clubs to take a closer look at the Spanish model in order to create more consistent European performances across a wider range of clubs.

A special thanks to Mahdi Rahimi, whose help in compiling some of the analysis/graphs was immense. We hope to be seeing some work from Mahdi in the near future. If you would like to get acquainted with him please follow him on Twitter @liaBIGPUNnov. Majority of raw transfer data has been collated due to the great work from the people at Transfermarkt.

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