When Ruben Rochina joined Blackburn Rovers at the end of the winter transfer window in 2011, Rovers were still a Premier League outfit. Lots of hype surrounded the young Spaniard’s move from Barcelona B. Three years down the line and Rochina has just made a second temporary move away from the club, in the form of a loan move to Spanish outfit Rayo Vallecano. If he impresses, the club hold an option to purchase him from Rovers. The move has been met by a split reaction from the Rovers faithful. Some feel Rochina has never had a fair chance and produces more than he’s given credit for, whilst others feel he is not needed by Rovers. This article will look to inspect his performances for Rovers and compare them to some of his colleagues during the period at the club.
Having made only 1 start in the half season that followed, its best to begin analyzing Rochina’s performances from the beginning of the 2011/12 season, his first full season at the club. However, we will present statistics that oversee his whole time at the club. Firstly, let’s look at his overall career stats at the club.
What becomes clear is that during the 3 years he has spent at the club, he’s only started 29 matches, during which he scored 11 times and made 3 assists. These are acceptable numbers for a second forward, and in reality better than any other player currently at the club except for Jordan Rhodes. His shooting ratio sees him hit a total of 110 shots, keeping 45 on target. Once again, the conversion rates, whilst not up to par for a top striker (which is not his role in the side nor the argument in question here) are acceptable for a second forward, an attacking midfielder or inside forward, all roles which he has played in for the side.
In order to analyze closer the impact that Rochina had during the games he took part in (and those which he did not) it makes sense to look at how the club fared during the period. With that in mind, the following table has been formulated:
Strikingly, what jumps out first is the fact that Rovers have had a winning record (or at the very least an on par one if one is technical) in each competition that Rochina has started in more than 2 matches. He only started one match during the second half of the season after he joined the club in 2011. Even in the relegation campaign of 2011/12, Rovers had an acceptable 12 points from the 9 games which he started in, losing only three times. Based on that record, Rovers would have had 51 points throughout a 38 match campaign and needless to say would have stayed up that season. In short, Blackburn took twice as many points that season when Ruben Rochina started than when he did not. Coincidence? It is inconclusive to directly correlate Rovers plight with Rochina’s appearances. However, it is one factor that should be kept in mind as one continues to assess the situation.
In 2012/13, during the club’s return to the Championship, Rovers best form “coincided” with Rochina starting games again. The club only lost 3 times when he started and the run included 5 wins. His starts formed more than one third of the club’s total league wins that season. Based on that ratio, the club would have had 75 points by the end of the season, enough for a play-off spot. Critics will again argue that this is coincidental and inconclusive.
Going further, Rochina appeared from the substitutes bench on countless occasions during his 3 years at the club. The table below describes the state of the match the moment Rochina stepped onto the pitch (from the 2011/12 season onwards) and compares the end result at the full time whistle.
Ruben Rochina came off the bench a total of 22 times during this period. The team was in a winning position twice before he was subbed in and continued to hold on for the result. The team was drawing matches 8 times when he was subbed on and turned the result to victory on 4 occasions, drew another 2 and lost the last 2 games. Finally, when subbed in during losing positions, Rochina helped turn 1 of the losses into a draw. However, to be fair, 7 of those losses were in the Premier League.
In the 2011/12 relegation campaign of the Premier League, Rochina scored 6 times from 13 starts in all competition (2 goals in the Premier League). Yakubu was top scorer that season with 18 and Junior Hoilett was next on 7 goals. The Spaniards 6 goals came from only 13 shots on target, on the back of a 35% shots on target ratio. On the other hand, Hoilett scored his 7 goals from 23 shots on target, which had emanated on the back of 69 shots in total. There is nothing outstanding about Rochina’s performances that season however nevertheless he had a respectable record which still stood out among his team-mates. That coupled with the fact that Rovers did better when he started matches adds food for thought. Keep in mind that Rochina was 21 for the majority of that campaign.
The 2012/13 campaign is the one which is bitter for proponents of Rochina. He had a stop-start campaign under a number of managers and found himself out of favor yet again towards the end of the season as he was loaned out to Real Zaragoza. However, his performances and numbers probably did not warrant that treatment. Despite featuring for only a part of the campaign, starting only 11 times in the league, he was the club’s joint second top scorer with Colin Kazim-Richards on 5 goals. His 3 assists were also the second highest in the whole squad. He also suffered 48 fouls in the league campaign which was second only to Kazim (50) despite the latter starting almost twice as many games (25). This illustrates that Rochina was a threat to opposition defenders who targeted him by fouling him when they could not stop him fairly. Unfortunately comprehensive passing stats were not compiled for the Championship until the current 2013/14 season so one cannot undertake further intensive analysis and comparison with him teammates. However, his performances in 2012/13 at Championship level do at the very least justify calls by supporters who believed Rochina should have played more games and did not receive the chances he probably deserved over the course of a full campaign in order to silence his critics.
A section of Rochina’s critics argue that he gives the ball away too much. However, in the 2013/14 season, his passing success ratio which stood at 83% is still higher than fan favorite David Dunn who had a 74% success ratio. At the same time, Rochina had a total of 1.6 key passes per game, 3rd highest in the side after Tom Cairney (2.6) and Alan Judge (1.7). David Dunn makes 1.2 key passes per game (WhoScored). Whilst the data is not conclusive due to the number of matches played, it still adds unbiased context to the overall conclusions that have to be drawn.
Ruben Rochina is probably unlikely to play for Blackburn Rovers again. His legacy will pose questions of “what if” from whichever perspective you look at it. His supporters will argue that he offered something different from within the Rovers squad, at the very least at Championship level, and that his performances warranted more opportunities. His critics will admit that although talented, he frustrated them with the lack of end product. The statistics presented today undermine parts of the latter’s argument. It is almost certain that Rochina could have provided more to the club, such is his potential. However, when a young 22 year old foreign player who has been part of the most tumultuous period in the club’s modern history has not been given the opportunity to play more than 5 consecutive matches at any given time, it is difficult to criticize him, when a number of his teammates have been given far more opportunities to cement a place in the side despite far less end product. Looking at his performances and the club’s results during the period, at different levels, critics would surely be harsh to argue that he did not deserve more opportunities in an unsettled Rovers side.
Other criticisms include the fact that he failed to cement a place in the side under most of the managers at the club. The flip side of the argument is which of those managers has been a success? Other than Gary Bowyer, who whilst generally supported by most sections of the fans largely due to a new long-term patient vision that most have taken up after the roller-coaster recent past, all the previous managers were unanimous failures. Even Bowyer has enough critics over a number of aspects of his reign that should at the very least undermine this argument as definitive.
Games are won by goals. Rochina has had a direct impact on wins through his goals and assists during his time at the club. Whilst there was room for improvement, critics would be hard pressed to name a replacement who took Rochina’s spot in the side and contributed to more either directly or indirectly where the club fared better. At the same time, how many times can facts be called “coincidental” within the realms of one argument?
Historically it’s been said, in football, getting to the top of the league is one thing but staying there is a whole different ball game. More often than not teams fail to defend the league title that they had worked so hard to gain in the first place. Over the past 20 years in some of Europe’s biggest leagues, only a handful of sides have managed to successfully defend their league titles. The question remains what, if any trends, exist between the sides that have managed to win back to back titles and whether there are lessons to be learned by new-be champions from their predecessors who had failed to defend their titles.
What we will do here is to analyze seven cases of clubs that failed to defend their famous league title victory the next season. The study will analyze the period since the 1992/93 season in the Premier League (Blackburn Rovers winners in 94/95 and Manchester City winners in 2011/12), Ligue 1 (Lille winners in 2010/11 and Montpellier winners in 2011/12), Serie A (Roma winners in 2000/01), Bundesliga (Dortmund winners in 2001/2) and La Liga (Deportivo winners in 1999/00). It is worth stating that there had been a number of other sides within the respective leagues that had failed to defend their titles including Stuttgart, Arsenal, Marseille and Wolfsburg among others, however, it was decided that the above formed an interesting platform for analysis. When it came to analyzing sides that had managed to win back-to-back titles, the selection pool was considerably smaller. A small condition was also put in for the sake of the integrity of the study and that was for a team to have been considered for selection for this aspect, there must have been at least an 8 season gap between their back-to-back successes and their previous league triumph. This was done so to isolate a side that could lay claim to be considered part of a larger successful era over a longer period (take Bayern Munich and Manchester United for instance). With that in mind, Dortmund (2010-12), Chelsea (2004-6) and Juventus (2011-13) were chosen to examine. Whilst Juventus have not clinched the Serie A title yet, they are 11 points ahead of Napoli with 6 games to go and barring a calamitous breakdown they are set to defend the title they masterfully had won the previous season.
A number of criteria will be compared and contrasted within the study and this includes the club’s transfer spending vis a vis the second season both against itself and against that of the new champion (if there had been one), the sale of key players, changes in performances of key player/s, managerial changes, performances in the Champions League and whether it posed a distraction to the squad, and the squad’s ability to cope with more games, as well as the historical size of the club in its league among other things. We hope by doing the aforementioned, some light may be shed onto common themes.
Blackburn Rovers (Premier League Champions in 1994/95)
In the early 1990s, Jack Walker had begun bank-rolling the town-club towards success. Rovers arguably formed the prototype of rich owner done-good in modern football. However, just when things were supposed to be starting, the club failed to build on its success and was eventually relegated to the Championship within 5 years of having lifted the Premier League title. One of the first startling discoveries from the side that attempted to defend its 1994/95 title was the fact that the club barely spent in the summer leading to the new season. Only £2.7m was spent and even by amounts being thrown away back at the time this was meager, especially considering that Walker had given Kenny Dalglish over 3 times that figure the previous season. This led to Dalglish deciding to step upstairs in a director of football capacity. Rovers also sold one of the key members of the title-winning side in Mark Atkins and that coupled with injuries and poor form to Chris Sutton and Jason Wilcox hampered the side to a point of finishing outside the European places.
Deportivo La Coruña (La Liga Champions in 1999/00)
Little-known Deportivo capped off the most successful era of its history with a title during a period when it was a force to be reckoned with domestically and a giant banana skin in European football. An undeniable factor was their transfer expenditure, pushing Barcelona and Real Madrid to the limits at the time. One of the mistakes the title-defending champions made was selling 3 key members of the first team, most notably Flavio Conceicao. Interestingly, Deportivo may be the only club in our research that actually improved its league performances in the second season. Unfortunately, it was going head-to-head with the Galacticos of Real Madrid. The side from the capital had a net spending of almost 10 times what Deportivo spent that season.
AS Roma (Serie A Champions in 2000/01)
Francesco Totti’s Roma were a force to be reckoned with at the turn of the new century, highlighted by extravagant spending which led to the signing of players such as Gabriel Batistuta, Vincenzo Montella and later Antonio Cassano. All this happened under the stewardship of Fabio Capello. One of the first things that becomes apparent is that Roma significantly reduced transfer spending after winning the title and this happened at a time when Juventus increased spending to £156m in the summer transfer window. Roma only had a net spending of £23m that summer. Whilst Roma did sign Cassano and Capello’s favorite son Christian Panucci, they let go one of the cornerstones of the title-winning side in Cristiano Zanetti. A lack of goals also hit the side at the wrong time of the season and this is illustrated by the fact that Totti, Batistuta and Montella scored 20 less goals between them throughout the campaign compared to the previous season.
Borussia Dortmund (Bundesliga Champions in 2001/2)
German champions, Dortmund, were experiencing a golden era in their history. This included back to back titles in the previous decade and their one and only Champions League triumph too. Little did they know that they were at the climax of their success and were about to face grave financial difficulties which almost led to their extinction. Again, just like the sides we examined before them, they decided to significantly cut down on spending after winning the title, whilst Bayern Munich spent 3 times their outlay. Two highlights of the new season was the departure of key players Evanilson and Jurgen Kohler, as well as the drop in performances of Bundesliga top-scorer Marcio Amoroso who only contributed 6 goals in the new campaign.
Lille (Ligue 1 Champions in 2010/11)
The French League is an interesting one. Over the last 20 seasons only 1 side has managed to defend its title and that has been Lyon. In fact, they defended it successfully 6 times. Less money is spent in the French league compared to many of the other top leagues in Europe and more time is spent on developing players and this could be one of the reasons that there has been such a close and level playing field over the past 20 years, only rivaled by the Bundesliga in this respect. The only time that this trend was broken was with Lyon who began competing on a European level. Lille had not spent any money the season they won the league and went on to spend £7.5m net when they had to defend their title. However, they did lose 3 key members of that title winning campaign in Adil Rami, Emerson and Yohann Cabaye. Interestingly, the new champions, Montpellier, spent virtually nothing when they won the title away from Lille.
Montpellier (Ligue 1 Champions in 2011/12)
Montpellier made the grave error of selling their key player after they won the league title. Olivier Giroud left to join Arsenal and was replaced by 2 or 3 lessor known strikers who have failed to get on the scoring-sheet regularly this season. Nevertheless, Louis Nicollin did allow some money to be spent this past summer. However, after a poor start to the campaign and an early exit from the Champions League, Rene Girard also lost his captain, Yanga-Mbiwa in a mid-season transfer to Newcastle United. The majority of the key members of the squad continue to perform admirably but in a league where the margins are minimal losing players of the caliber of those Montpellier have lost is an insurmountable obstacle.
Manchester City (Premier League Champions in 2011/12)
The Abu Dhabi Sheikhs bought Manchester City with the vision of turning them into the biggest club in England and later Europe. Whilst City wrestled the title away from city-rivals Manchester United they have failed to put up a successful defence of their title and formed the inspiration behind this article. The first highlight of their failed defence is a 40% reduction in transfer spending. Secondly, Manchester United out-spent them this season. None of the sides we have examined in the study have managed to defend their title having spent less the following campaign unless it was still a higher amount than their closest rivals. Next, Roberto Mancini sold 3 key members of the title-winning side in Nigel de Jong, Adam Johnson and Mario Balotelli. The club’s best performers also failed to hit the heights of the previous campaign and this is mostly highlighted in the goals contribution of their top-scorers. An early exit in the Champions League forms another stereotypical characteristic of failure to defend the league title. In short, Manchester City form the text-book study of how not to defend your title.
Those Who Succeeded in Defending their Title
Chelsea (Defended their Premier League Title in 2005/6)
Jose Mourinho’s Chelsea had just set a Premier League record-high number of points in 2004/5 and lifted the double. The following campaign saw them successfully defend their title. One of the highlights of the success was the fact that they strengthened the starting line-up with the signing of Lyon’s Michael Essien. They also added Asier Del Horno and Shaun Wright-Phillips, with the former making the left back position his own. It also helped that Chelsea out-spent runners-up Manchester United and the performances of their key players somewhat improved (Drogba and Lampard both improved their goal contributions).
Dortmund (Defended their Bundesliga Title in 2011/12)
German champions Dortmund not only defended their title but also completed the double having trounced rivals Bayern Munich 5-2 in the Pokal final. Dortmund did increase its own spending even if Bayern Munich managed to out-spend them. Their transfer activity saw one Turkish-origin star replaced by another with Nuri Sahin departing to Spain and Ilkay Gundogan replacing him. On paper it seemed like Jurgen Klopp’s side did not get the better end of that deal but time has shown that to be false. Dortmund’s players continued to excel with Robert Lewandowski improving his finishing and other players contributing more goals than previously. Dortmund finished 6 points better off than the previous campaign.
Juventus (On Course to Defend Serie A Title in 2012/13)
Italian champions Juventus are back on top of the football pyramid domestically after a tumultuous few seasons, which included relegation due to match-fixing. Juve have virtually been alone in lavishly spending in recent seasons. This has helped them re-build their side. Whilst they decreased their transfer expenditure this season, it was still significantly higher than closest rivals Napoli. Antonio Conte also retained his key players and built on it by adding 3 key members to the squad in Giovinco, Asamoah and Isla. His side is on course to better its points haul of last season when it had gone unbeaten.
Looking at the above analysis, it is difficult to find a wholesome irrefutable rule of thumb in analyzing successes and failures when it comes to defending titles. Before attempting to do so, it is interesting to note that over the past 20 years the Premier League has seen 7 back to back champions (6 Manchester United, 1 Chelsea), the Bundesliga has seen 5 (3 Bayern Munich, 2 Dortmund), Ligue 1 has seen 6 but it all involved Lyon, La Liga has had 7 back to back champions (6 Barcelona, 1 Real Madrid), and Serie A is on course for its 9th this season (4 Inter, Juventus soon to be 3, with 2 for Milan). It must be added that Milan and Barcelona won their 1992/93 titles on the back of having won the previous season. What this suggests is that money plays a huge role in defining the legacy of the sides. Less dominance is found in the leagues where less money is spent.
One of the common characteristics of Chelsea, Dortmund and Juventus’ successful retention of titles is the fact that none weakened their sides during the summer after becoming champions. At the same time, Juventus and Chelsea both continued to invest in their squad and out-spent their rivals. Dortmund may have spent less than Bayern Munich but it must be noted that the figures being spent by either side would be dwarfed by some of the money being thrown around by lessor sides in some of Europe’s other leagues. So one could argue Bayern Munich’s expenditure in 2011/12 may have been higher than Dortmund’s but it was not at a level which could help shift the title back to Bavaria.
Another factor that must be highlighted is that all the sides that failed to defend their titles saw their top-scorer of the previous campaign fail to repeat his feats. Dortmund had Lewandowski score more goals than Lucas Barrios had the previous campaign. Juventus have three players 1 to 2 goals short of improving on last season’s top scorer with 6 games to go, whilst Chelsea saw both Frank Lampard and Didier Drogba improve on their tallies.
Amazingly, only Deportivo and Juventus made it into the Quarter Finals of the Champions League from the 10 cases studied. Lille and Montpellier were the only sides that increased spending after winning the title but failed to retain their crown. It must be added that Montpellier had a negative net expenditure though. Also, only one side improved its point tally and failed to retain the title and that was Deportivo.
Finally, it is clear from the analysis that only a few sides attempted to continue towards building a legacy after winning the title. Most of the clubs were happy to taste one-time glory and cash in on their success. This includes Blackburn and Montpellier. Others such as Dortmund, at the turn of the century, and Roma decided to keep the status quo whilst rivals continued to spend to make up for lost ground. Only a few sides attempted to create a legacy and these were the 3 sides that managed to defend their league titles and arguably Deportivo who just fell short. Lyon, who were not addressed in the analysis, also fit the bill. Therefore the motivation of the club owners is quite central to what happens next for the clubs in question.
The study above was undertaken with the goal of shedding light onto why retaining a league title proves to be difficult for most sides in Europe’s top leagues. Whilst there are certain intangible and unquantifiable elements at play such as the motivation and ambition levels of the players at hand, it is clear that lessons can be learned for sides that are in a process of winning a title after a long and dry spell. Certainly, the grounds exist for more conclusions to be drawn by those studying the data under the microscope.
Since Indian poultry-farmers Venkys bought Blackburn Rovers in November 2010, the club and its supporters have been through a roller-coaster ride. Its landscape is almost unrecognizable from that of which was inherited by the owners. This does not ring any truer than towards the playing squad. Venkys have received heavy criticism for the way they’ve managed or more accurately mis-managed the running of the club including their almost eternal backing of then-manager Steve Kean. They have also been criticized for the caliber of players brought into the club as well as the huge turn-over of players moving out during the same period.
This was then… (Playing Squad on day Venkys purchased the club)
You might have forgotten some of the players who were associated with the club at the time Venkys purchased it. It does seem a lifetime ago. Only 7 players from the first team playing squad from November 2010 are still with the club today. However, only Martin Olsson and Grant Hanley can consider themselves regular starters in the current set-up. The squad at that time was short on players in the wide areas whilst it seemed well stocked in most other positions especially at center back. It was also arguably lacking a quality finisher who could regularly score goals at any level as well as a fit midfield enforcer who could provide a good foil for Steven N’Zonzi. The squad considered Christopher Samba, Phil Jones, Martin Olsson, N’Zonzi, Junior Hoilett, and Niko Kalinic as among its sell-able assets.
This is now… (Playing Squad on February 8, 2013)
The current squad is much thinner at center back and still lacks a strong central midfield partnership. However, what it has gained is a top quality finisher in Jordan Rhodes. The make-up of the squad can be described as hard-working, robust and solid at best. Whilst players in the initial squad moved on for 8 digit fees in a couple of the cases, it is hard to see anyone being sold for anything near that fee, with the exception of Jordan Rhodes who, at the very least, should fetch the same fee he joined the club under. Other than Rhodes, and possibly Scott Dann, largely due to him being English, it is difficult to see anyone fetching more than £5 million from the current squad. Martin Olsson, who was once rated in the £6m-£7m bracket could now cost buyers a more realistic £4m fee at the end of the season.
Who They Bought
By December 2011, Rovers were at the crossroads where the upcoming transfer window, at the time, would have played a crucial role in the club staying up or getting relegated. Most of the transfers under Venkys had not panned out well until that period and the pressure was on to get it right that time around. However, as history is testament, Venkys took the cautious route and did not undertake the sort of spending that they would commission in the next transfer window. They would also let go of both Christopher Samba and a fully fit Ryan Nelsen.
In the overall scheme of things, the owners have overseen the acquisition of 25 players up till and including the January 2013 transfer window. They have “spent” over £34 million on those transfers, and this does not include an exorbitant amount on agent fees, namely during the first two transfer windows of their tenure. In some cases, the agent fees dwarfed the transfer fee in question. Dann and Rhodes were the most expensive signings on the list with nine of the signings being made on free transfers.
Looking at the list above, it is difficult to judge how many of those transfers have turned out to be a success. If the assessment had to be done today then other than Yakubu and Rhodes, it is difficult to call any other transfer a success. Ruben Rochina may prove to be a success down the line or at the very least may be sold for more money than he joined the club under the owners, which would make it a first for Venkys. Scott Dann has improved this season but Rovers are mid-table in the Championship and its difficult to suggest that his performances will ever attract the sort of interest that he had been allegedly receiving for a period of his career at Birmingham. Back to back relegation campaigns do not read well on the center back’s CV.
Interestingly, 10 of the players that they had brought into the club are no longer with with it today. That is a staggering 40% of the transfers.
Almost the same number of players have left the club under Venkys reign as had joined them. If one had to form two starting line-ups out of the two lists and pit them against each other it would see the likes of Bunn, Salgado, Samba, Nelsen, Emerton – Diouf, Jones, N’Zonzi, Hoilett – Yakubu, Kalinic representing the players who were sold, take on a team including Bruno Ribeiro, Dann, Nuno Henrique, Orr – Formica, Murphy, Etuhu, Markus Olsson – Rochina, and Rhodes. Venkys have yet to sign a goalkeeper on a permanent contract, with Pole Sandomiercki having joined the club on loan in the summer of 2012.
Needless to say the quality present in the list of exodus is clear for all to see. A number of the players formed the backbones of Rovers sides over the previous 4-5 seasons prior to Venkys ownership.
The first striking item off the list is the fact that despite statements stating Venkys have spent money and have shown their commitment to the cause in recent times, they have made more money from transfers than they have spent (not including agent fees, wages and compensation agreements to release players). A second striking element is the fact that some of the players that had been present in the list of transfers into the club also feature here. Four players have been bought and sold by Venkys during their tenure and all for a loss (not including Myles Anderson who joined and left on free transfers). Radosav Petrovic, Simon Vukcevic and Yakubu joined the club for a combined fee of at least £5.5m but left the club for a fee thought to be £1.5m in total as well as a compensation package to get one of them off the club’s payroll. Nothing illustrates failure in transfer dealings more than the fact that Rovers, under Venkys, have gotten rid of many of the same players they have brought in. The list does not even include players who have been sent out on loan. This brings us to the next section of the analysis.
Here Today, Gone Tomorrow
Throughout the article it has become apparent that Venkys have admitted failure in a number of their transfer dealings through the exit of the same players virtually as soon as they’d joined the club. A total of 12 out of the 25 players that they signed have left the club either on loan or a full transfer. Let’s not forget that two of the 25 players only joined the club during the last two weeks, and this effectively means that more than half of the players brought into the club have gone on to leave the club in the period in question.
The list below provides some riveting realities.
The players at the top of the table have survived – till date – the revolving doors at Ewood Park. From the rest, Ruben Rochina’s stay was the longest. He completed exactly 2 years as a Rovers player before being shipped out, surprisingly, to Real Zaragoza. Argentine Mauro Formica was 8 days short of his two year anniversary as well. Diogo Rosado only remained for 153 days before being given away on loan to Benfica’s B side for the rest of the season. He appeared twice in Rovers colors in the Championship. That’s twice as much as Jordan Slew or Paulo Jorge have ever put on the shirt. Myles Anderson remained at the club for 411 consecutive days without making a single appearance before being shipped out on loan to Aldershot. Bruno Ribeiro appeared once almost every 100 days before leaving on loan back to Brazil. The numbers prove hard to take for Rovers faithful.
It is difficult for any un-biased person to assess the facts presented above and draw any other conclusion than that Venkys transfer policy has been a complete and utter failure. As owners, you’d be assessed on your general running of club, choice of managers, patience, transfer policy as well as success during your tenure. This article wanted to assess one cornerstone of the above in isolation of the others. Theoretically, what would make for a successful transfer policy?
Firstly, one would assess the quality of the squad at a said time and compare it to the one that exists after a set period. In the case of Venkys, the squad looks weaker, on paper, than it was at the time they took over. The balance of the squad is different with some gaps filled whilst others expanded compared to the squad they inherited. The Jordan Rhodes transfer proves to be the one undoubted masterstroke of their reign, even though he joined for a bloated fee of £8 million. The fact that he is young, and British coupled with the transfer fees being paid for British players in the current era (see Steven Fletcher as an example) mean that barring a horrendous injury or a complete 180 degree turn-around in his fortunes on the pitch, Rhodes will leave Rovers for at least the same fee he joined the club under.
Secondly, one would analyze the assets or potential assets a club brings in on the playing front. Venkys brought in a number of young players with a view towards building a side for the future and selling its components on for a profit, or at least that’s what the owners publicly said at the time in late-2010. However, a number of those same players have already moved on and not after having their careers flourish at Rovers. In fact, one could argue that for many of those young hopefuls their careers stalled at Rovers, either through not performing at an adequate level or by the fact that they were not given enough opportunities or the environment to build upon.
Thirdly, one would assess the value of the squad. Looking at the current squad, it is difficult to see how more than £15m would be raised through the sale of the whole first team squad not including Rhodes. Phil Jones was sold for more than that figure. That puts things into perspective.
In a nutshell, it is difficult to find any case for optimism for the owners overall transfer policy. It is interesting that over the four transfer windows that they have been in charge of, they’ve had a number of different people pulling the strings on the ins and outs at the club but the overall results have all been less than acceptable. If their choice of managers has proven to provide the catalyst for Rovers slide towards mid-table obscurity in the Championship, then their transfer policy has provided the long-term back-drop in devaluing and weakening the squad to the point that it arguably belongs where it currently is.
Many analysts considered Rovers squad to be the best in the Championship before a ball was kicked in the summer of 2012. The players undoubtedly under-performed but it still did not change that fact. However, today, it is difficult to hold that point of view any longer. Rovers current squad does not look like anything more than just another average Championship squad that is being carried by the goals of one exceptional player in Jordan Rhodes. If those goals somehow push Rovers back into the Premier League again by the end of May, then Venkys may get another chance to remedy their transfer policy. But if history is a lesson, then one thing is for sure and that is Venkys do not learn from their mistakes as much or as quickly as it is needed in the business of football.
With relegation confirmed for Blackburn Rovers after a 11-year spell in the Premier League, their longest ever run in the top flight, in the post-war period, supporters, once again, turned their anger towards the owners, Venkys, and, manager, Steve Kean. As the dust begins to settle on the disastrous season, the mainstream media, for the first time, has taken an active interest in the on-goings at Ewood Park. Some of the “revelations” of the past few days have been well known to most of the supporters for the good part of the past 6 months. Nevertheless, with Steve Kean emphatically stating that “I’m here for the long term” as well as the owners being “100% right for the club” as well as how “these are exciting times for the club”, one has to wonder what happens next and whether Venkys are too out of touch with reality to be able to salvage the situation and stabilize a sinking ship.
If you ask any Rovers supporter whether there is anything Venkys can do to make them want to retain them as owners, the answer would be a resounding and instinctive “no”. However, if one approaches the situation as a realist, considering the fact that the ideal scenario of Venkys wanting to sell the club and potential buyers coming forward to make an acceptable offer to Venkys may not exist, supporters may have to reconsider the “no negotiation” stance that they rightfully hold. At this point, we want to present a “four-point plan” which is likely to “reset” the situation between owners and the supporters. The question, however, remains do the owners actually care what the fans think? And do they really want to make a success of their tenure? If the answers to those are yes, then they need to take a close look at the following, not for inspiration but for application.
1) Sack Steve Kean
Steve Kean undoubtedly has a poor results record in “management”, the primary criteria of judging a football manager. Whichever way he may want to spin the situation, the facts remain facts as highlighted as early as December 2011. Kean is, without a shadow of a doubt, beyond the point of no return with supporters and its not purely down to results on the pitch. His handling of the media, dubious transfers and team selection, the lack of acknowledgement of Rovers plight, and what fans see as a disrespect to their existence and views, combined with the circumstances within which he got the job in the first place, as well the “unsackable” tag which has been given to him have not made Kean a popular man. Whilst Kean survived the first wave of criticism which hit their peak during December 2011, the national media failed to look too closely at the facts, and Rovers supporters decided to “back off” in the interest of supporting the side in the most complete fashion. Instead of acknowledging that, Kean came out with ludicrous statements such as one where he said he receives “500 letters of support from fans everyday”. This time around, on the back of relegation, the national media is no longer as negligent and Rovers are under the microscope and so is Kean. Venkys should have sacked their man by now, but they must not waste another second in doing so and that is the first step towards “salvation”.
2) Acknowledge their Mistakes
Even before replacing the manager, Venkys must come out and finally communicate with the fans in a transparent and honest fashion. The whole footballing world is aware of Rovers plight and it is clear that the decisions that the owners have taken in the last 18 months have resulted in relegation. Yes, the owners are new to football and they have made mistakes, but if “no one is to blame” as Venkatesh Rao states during a telephone interview with Indian media only a few days after relegation, then Venkys are delusional. There is enough blame to go around and the owners need to acknowledge that before they continue promising success and achievement for the future, something which they have been doing, foolishly, from day one.
3) Hire an Experienced and Popular Manager
The title says it all. At this point, Venkys need to think long and hard about the next manager. Not only must he be the right choice from a footballing perspective but he must also be “popular” enough with the fan-base in order to quell the frustration, worries and apathy which Venkys and Kean have instilled onto the fans. Supporters have lost faith and have spoken with their feet. Approximately 3,000 fewer fans were attending home games from just before the end of December, compared to after it. That is a crushing blow to the owners, even though they do not seem to understand its implications yet. More fans are expected to “walk away” by the time the upcoming season begins largely of the post-relegation fiasco including Kean’s unbelievable press conference for the Chelsea game. Names like Avram Grant and Dave Jones, who has an SEM link are simply not going to work. The new manager must bring the fans together and there must be no inkling of controversy around his appointment. Alan Curbishley, a tandem of Graeme Souness with club legend Tugay, as well as Mick McCarthy may all have the experience, personality and character to get supporters “on-side” and would all be available for work. However, it would be a valid question as to who in their right minds would work for Venkys with the way they have been running the club, and that leads us to the next point.
4) Bring in the Professionals to Take Care of Business
This measure is on par with sacking Kean as manager in terms of its revitalizing effect and importance. Venkys must approach to re-hire John Williams and Tom Finn. Whilst it is unclear whether both men would be interested to return to Rovers in the first place, the Indians need to make it clear to them that they will have carte blanche in re-stabilizing the club and will have no interference from Pune. A communication line will be re-established with supporters, the media, and the owners and the club can be run the way any good club is supposed to be run. They will be popular appointments with the fans and bring back a feeling of familiarity as well as stability to Ewood Park. The playing staff will also be relieved and question marks over the “running of the club” would be quashed immediately just with their presence. Venkys will gain a sense of legitimacy in the process too. People can accept mistakes, but to repeat the same mistakes and to be oblivious to your responsibilities would be a fatal error on the part of the owners.
With a critical summer coming up for Blackburn Rovers, the right decisions need to be taken on who to sell, who to retain and who to buy in order to best position the club for the upcoming campaign. Williams and Finn have the background, experience and know-how to undertake those tasks as smoothly as possible whilst having as blind a support from fans as possible, in the process. With them at the helm there will be no question of vested interests over transfers either.
Blackburn Rovers is currently in the doldrums. Steve Kean and Venkys may not want to acknowledge it and may be promising “exciting times ahead” but delusions such as those do nothing but to infuriate an already tortured fan-base. In an ideal scenario, the owners would decide to sell the club. However, Venkys have been adamant that they would not consider a sale. If they are serious about that and they are serious about getting it right as they have been telling many people in recent months, then the time for change and action is here and now. The four point plan presented here does not guarantee success on the pitch. But it does promise to unify the fan-base and get people to focus on matters on the field instead of distractions, largely caused by mistakes undertaken by Venkys, during the past 18 months. It would also give Venkys as close a clean slate as possible with many fans, even though it may be a case of “forgive but not forget”. Digressing from any of those four points would negate the plan. This is emphatically true in terms of sacking Kean and approaching John Williams and Tom Finn. If one was a betting man, based on Venkys prior history at Rovers, you’d have to think that they would not go through with such a plan, but if they thought long and hard about it and found that their goals match those highlighted initially in this piece, then they’d be foolish not to. As much as they are the actual owners, supporters see Venkys as custodians, because after all, in their eyes, this is the club that Jack Walker built.
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When Jack Walker officially took over Blackburn Rovers in January 1991, even the most day-dreaming of supporters could not have foreshadowed what lay ahead for the club. Threatened with relegation from the old Second Division (equivalent to Championship) at the time, the club would become champions of the English Premier League in fours years. Walker restructured Ewood Park, building the Jack Walker Stand, spending approximately £20 million to do so. Money was no issue, for a period at the club, with some of the best of British talents joining the club, from manager Kenny Dalglish to Alan Shearer, Chris Sutton, David Batty, Graeme Le Saux, and Tim Sherwood among others. Supporters have had to endure taunts of having “bought” the Premier League title, even though the club spent just under £2 million more than second place Manchester United in assembling its squad. In fact, Manchester United spent more money on transfers that season than Rovers had. Uncle Jack, as he is affectionately known, would also invest in the town of Blackburn and is regarded as a hero within the community as much as within the football club.
Walker watched tearfully as his beloved Rovers side confirmed its relegation with a 0-0 draw at Ewood Park against Manchester United near the end of the 1998/99 season. He wouldn’t live to see Rovers gain promotion as he passed away, aged 71, at the start of their promotion campaign of 2000/01. Two of the players that played a key role in getting Rovers back to the Premier League had been David Dunn, still at the club today, having returned from a spell at Birmingham City, and Damien Duff, now at Fulham. Marlon Broomes, Martin Taylor, Damien Johnson, and Jonathan Douglas all played some role during that season. All 6 players were products of the successful Academy. As was Jack Walker’s ultimate goal with Rovers, he wanted to make it a self-financing club in the long-term, mirroring the Manchester United youth development of the early-to-mid nineties. It was in 1996, that an official “youth structure” was put in place at the club, bringing in players such as Dunn and Duff into the system even before the current facilities existed. The class of Dunn and Duff was losing finalists in the FA Youth Cup in 1998. However, it would be a few months after Jack Walker’s passing that his brainchild, the Academy would be inaugurated.
The Brockhall Village Academy, opened in 2001, cost approximately £4.75 million as state of the art facilities on par with top training facilities anywhere in Europe. It includes 6 full-size pitches, indoor training facilities, indoor running track, outdoor running “hill”, a swimming pool, goalkeeper training facilities as well as accommodation for the youth players. In the 2001 FA Youth Cup, Rovers would be losing finalists again. In terms of league activity, the Rovers youth side won the U-17 Premier Academy League in the 1998/1999 and the U-19 Premier Academy League in 2002/3 before the U-19 and U-17 leagues were merged to form the U-18 Academy Premier League in 2004/5, when Rovers won the inaugural edition. In fact, when it comes to a roll of honor in the Premier Academy League, Blackburn Rovers are the second most successful side after Arsenal, winning 3 leagues, compared to Arsenal’s 5. Rovers and Arsenal are the only ever sides to have won Academy Premier Leagues in all 3 age categories. Even West Ham’s heralded Youth Academy, has not tasted any glory, in the aftermath of producing the “Golden Generation” of 1998-2000, boasting the likes of Joe Cole, Michael Carrick and Frank Lampard, when they lifted 1 FA Youth Cup and back-to-back U-19 Academy Premier League titles.
In terms of coaching and managing the set-up, Bobby Downes, formerly involved with youth football at Aston Villa, Port Vale and Watford, where he was Director of Youth Football, under former England manager, Graham Taylor, was recruited in 1997 to a similar role at Rovers, eventually being the man responsible for running the Academy when it was officially set-up. The thinking ahead was important in terms of strategic planning from the club in the mid-1990’s, putting into place the tools necessary to maximize the output from the structure even before it may have physically been there. During his tenure, Downes oversaw numerous players from under his stewardship being promoted to the Rovers first team squad, some more permanently than others. They included Dunn, Duff, Martin Taylor, Jay McEveley, Paul Gallagher, Matt Derbyshire, Junior Hoilett, and Martin Olsson, who was recruited to the Academy at the age of 17 from Sweden in 2006. In some cases, even when certain players were deemed not good enough for the Rovers first team, they were sold off, usually to Championship clubs, and thus raised important revenue for the club. That list included players such as Damien Johnson, Ben Burgess, Neil Danns, Jemal Johnson, and Jonathan Douglas. Under his stewardship, Rovers youth excelled in competitive football as illustrated through their performances in both the Academy Premier League and FA Youth Cup. In the summer of 2009, whilst Sam Allardyce was manager, Bobby Downes left the club by mutual consent. Phil Cannon was recruited to become the new Academy Manager.
Cannon, boasting an impressive background in youth development, was previously Head of Youth Development at Swindon, where he oversaw the early development of Theo Walcott, but more recently was Head of Recruitment at Everton, who are widely regarded as running one of the best youth set-ups in the country, producing an endless array of players including Wayne Rooney, Francis Jeffers, Leon Osman, Jack Rodwell and most recently Ross Barkley among others. Cannon, interviewed at the time of hiring, by the official Rovers website stated, “If that first team was full of local boys, it would be fantastic because they are playing for ‘their’ team. I think the locals can identify more with them and I think the local boys do try a little bit harder”. Since then, Phil Jones, Grant Hanley, Adam Henley, Josh Morris, Jason Lowe, and Nick Blackman have been promoted to the first team squad, with some such as Jones, Hanley and Lowe playing integral roles during the last couple of seasons. Obviously, some of the credit for their development still lay with the previous regime under Downes, nevertheless, the good work that the current staff including Cannon, Alan Miller as Head of Recruitment, David Lowe as Head of Youth Coaching, as well as team coaches for the U-18 and U-16 sides, Terry McPhillips, Simon Ireland and Tony Grant cannot go unnoticed.
The current edition of the Rovers youth set-up has seen the U-18 side make the semi-finals of the FA Youth Cup where they will play bitter rivals Burnley in a two-legged affair. Labelled by on-lookers as possibly the best batch of talent to come through Brockhall at once, a number of key players have alternated between Reserves League football and the Academy Premier League this season. Stand-out performers include the cream of the crop Hugo Fernandez, a young Spaniard, who only turned 18 earlier this year and can play anywhere along the middle of the pitch, from defence to an attacking midfield position. He has taken strides in his development this season as he has been given a more advanced role compared to his early times at the club. He has recently been making more regular appearances for the Reserves although still plays a crucial role at Academy level especially in the FA Youth Cup. John O’Sullivan is a young Irish midfielder who is comfortable across midfield and has played a few times for the Reserves this season too. He’s also been capped at U-19 level by Ireland. Jack O’Connell, a left sided defender comfortable at center back or left back was capped by the England U-18 side in March 2012. Robbie Cotton, long hailed as one of the best players that the Academy had produced, judging by the player’s potential, has been promoted to the first team squad this season, although he has yet to make an appearance for them. He is still involved in the FA Youth Cup and scored the winning penalty in a thrilling Quarter Final victory over Newcastle, and features regularly for Gary Bowyer’s Reserve side.
If Blackburn Rovers overcome Burnley, they would be a step closer to winning the FA Youth Cup for the first time since 1959, something that players such as Duff, Dunn, or Jones failed to do, as well as confirming their promise. Considering the club’s current fortunes on and off the pitch, it would not be beyond the scope of reality if some of the current Academy batch began featuring for the first team squad by next season. At the same time, the Blackburn Rovers Academy has helped fund itself and more-over through the transfer of players. All in all, just under £60m has been raised since 1994 through the transfer of players, an average of £3.3m a year. Some of the players have ended up winning Champions Leagues, Premier Leagues, and have gone on to play at World Cups and European Championships for their countries. Rovers hold 2 of the top 5 most expensive Academy transfers in English football history, with both Damien Duff and Phil Jones, who cost their future clubs a reported £17m each. Only Andy Carroll, Wayne Rooney, Rio Ferdinand and Owen Hargreaves (if you want to include cross-border transfers) have ever gained their respective academies more money. Considering the overall picture, coupled with Blackburn being a town in arguably the most hotly-contested catchment area for recruitment of youth players, with up to 30 clubs, in competing for youngsters in the North West, it becomes clear that the backbone of the Academy factory floor has been key in maintaining Blackburn Rovers position on and off the pitch in the Premier League, in what was Uncle Jack’s parting and, hopefully, eternal, gift to the club.
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