When Ruben Rochina joined Blackburn Rovers at the end of the winter transfer window in 2011, Rovers were still a Premier League outfit. Lots of hype surrounded the young Spaniard’s move from Barcelona B. Three years down the line and Rochina has just made a second temporary move away from the club, in the form of a loan move to Spanish outfit Rayo Vallecano. If he impresses, the club hold an option to purchase him from Rovers. The move has been met by a split reaction from the Rovers faithful. Some feel Rochina has never had a fair chance and produces more than he’s given credit for, whilst others feel he is not needed by Rovers. This article will look to inspect his performances for Rovers and compare them to some of his colleagues during the period at the club.
Having made only 1 start in the half season that followed, its best to begin analyzing Rochina’s performances from the beginning of the 2011/12 season, his first full season at the club. However, we will present statistics that oversee his whole time at the club. Firstly, let’s look at his overall career stats at the club.
What becomes clear is that during the 3 years he has spent at the club, he’s only started 29 matches, during which he scored 11 times and made 3 assists. These are acceptable numbers for a second forward, and in reality better than any other player currently at the club except for Jordan Rhodes. His shooting ratio sees him hit a total of 110 shots, keeping 45 on target. Once again, the conversion rates, whilst not up to par for a top striker (which is not his role in the side nor the argument in question here) are acceptable for a second forward, an attacking midfielder or inside forward, all roles which he has played in for the side.
In order to analyze closer the impact that Rochina had during the games he took part in (and those which he did not) it makes sense to look at how the club fared during the period. With that in mind, the following table has been formulated:
Strikingly, what jumps out first is the fact that Rovers have had a winning record (or at the very least an on par one if one is technical) in each competition that Rochina has started in more than 2 matches. He only started one match during the second half of the season after he joined the club in 2011. Even in the relegation campaign of 2011/12, Rovers had an acceptable 12 points from the 9 games which he started in, losing only three times. Based on that record, Rovers would have had 51 points throughout a 38 match campaign and needless to say would have stayed up that season. In short, Blackburn took twice as many points that season when Ruben Rochina started than when he did not. Coincidence? It is inconclusive to directly correlate Rovers plight with Rochina’s appearances. However, it is one factor that should be kept in mind as one continues to assess the situation.
In 2012/13, during the club’s return to the Championship, Rovers best form “coincided” with Rochina starting games again. The club only lost 3 times when he started and the run included 5 wins. His starts formed more than one third of the club’s total league wins that season. Based on that ratio, the club would have had 75 points by the end of the season, enough for a play-off spot. Critics will again argue that this is coincidental and inconclusive.
Going further, Rochina appeared from the substitutes bench on countless occasions during his 3 years at the club. The table below describes the state of the match the moment Rochina stepped onto the pitch (from the 2011/12 season onwards) and compares the end result at the full time whistle.
Ruben Rochina came off the bench a total of 22 times during this period. The team was in a winning position twice before he was subbed in and continued to hold on for the result. The team was drawing matches 8 times when he was subbed on and turned the result to victory on 4 occasions, drew another 2 and lost the last 2 games. Finally, when subbed in during losing positions, Rochina helped turn 1 of the losses into a draw. However, to be fair, 7 of those losses were in the Premier League.
In the 2011/12 relegation campaign of the Premier League, Rochina scored 6 times from 13 starts in all competition (2 goals in the Premier League). Yakubu was top scorer that season with 18 and Junior Hoilett was next on 7 goals. The Spaniards 6 goals came from only 13 shots on target, on the back of a 35% shots on target ratio. On the other hand, Hoilett scored his 7 goals from 23 shots on target, which had emanated on the back of 69 shots in total. There is nothing outstanding about Rochina’s performances that season however nevertheless he had a respectable record which still stood out among his team-mates. That coupled with the fact that Rovers did better when he started matches adds food for thought. Keep in mind that Rochina was 21 for the majority of that campaign.
The 2012/13 campaign is the one which is bitter for proponents of Rochina. He had a stop-start campaign under a number of managers and found himself out of favor yet again towards the end of the season as he was loaned out to Real Zaragoza. However, his performances and numbers probably did not warrant that treatment. Despite featuring for only a part of the campaign, starting only 11 times in the league, he was the club’s joint second top scorer with Colin Kazim-Richards on 5 goals. His 3 assists were also the second highest in the whole squad. He also suffered 48 fouls in the league campaign which was second only to Kazim (50) despite the latter starting almost twice as many games (25). This illustrates that Rochina was a threat to opposition defenders who targeted him by fouling him when they could not stop him fairly. Unfortunately comprehensive passing stats were not compiled for the Championship until the current 2013/14 season so one cannot undertake further intensive analysis and comparison with him teammates. However, his performances in 2012/13 at Championship level do at the very least justify calls by supporters who believed Rochina should have played more games and did not receive the chances he probably deserved over the course of a full campaign in order to silence his critics.
A section of Rochina’s critics argue that he gives the ball away too much. However, in the 2013/14 season, his passing success ratio which stood at 83% is still higher than fan favorite David Dunn who had a 74% success ratio. At the same time, Rochina had a total of 1.6 key passes per game, 3rd highest in the side after Tom Cairney (2.6) and Alan Judge (1.7). David Dunn makes 1.2 key passes per game (WhoScored). Whilst the data is not conclusive due to the number of matches played, it still adds unbiased context to the overall conclusions that have to be drawn.
Ruben Rochina is probably unlikely to play for Blackburn Rovers again. His legacy will pose questions of “what if” from whichever perspective you look at it. His supporters will argue that he offered something different from within the Rovers squad, at the very least at Championship level, and that his performances warranted more opportunities. His critics will admit that although talented, he frustrated them with the lack of end product. The statistics presented today undermine parts of the latter’s argument. It is almost certain that Rochina could have provided more to the club, such is his potential. However, when a young 22 year old foreign player who has been part of the most tumultuous period in the club’s modern history has not been given the opportunity to play more than 5 consecutive matches at any given time, it is difficult to criticize him, when a number of his teammates have been given far more opportunities to cement a place in the side despite far less end product. Looking at his performances and the club’s results during the period, at different levels, critics would surely be harsh to argue that he did not deserve more opportunities in an unsettled Rovers side.
Other criticisms include the fact that he failed to cement a place in the side under most of the managers at the club. The flip side of the argument is which of those managers has been a success? Other than Gary Bowyer, who whilst generally supported by most sections of the fans largely due to a new long-term patient vision that most have taken up after the roller-coaster recent past, all the previous managers were unanimous failures. Even Bowyer has enough critics over a number of aspects of his reign that should at the very least undermine this argument as definitive.
Games are won by goals. Rochina has had a direct impact on wins through his goals and assists during his time at the club. Whilst there was room for improvement, critics would be hard pressed to name a replacement who took Rochina’s spot in the side and contributed to more either directly or indirectly where the club fared better. At the same time, how many times can facts be called “coincidental” within the realms of one argument?
Since Indian poultry-farmers Venkys bought Blackburn Rovers in November 2010, the club and its supporters have been through a roller-coaster ride. Its landscape is almost unrecognizable from that of which was inherited by the owners. This does not ring any truer than towards the playing squad. Venkys have received heavy criticism for the way they’ve managed or more accurately mis-managed the running of the club including their almost eternal backing of then-manager Steve Kean. They have also been criticized for the caliber of players brought into the club as well as the huge turn-over of players moving out during the same period.
This was then… (Playing Squad on day Venkys purchased the club)
You might have forgotten some of the players who were associated with the club at the time Venkys purchased it. It does seem a lifetime ago. Only 7 players from the first team playing squad from November 2010 are still with the club today. However, only Martin Olsson and Grant Hanley can consider themselves regular starters in the current set-up. The squad at that time was short on players in the wide areas whilst it seemed well stocked in most other positions especially at center back. It was also arguably lacking a quality finisher who could regularly score goals at any level as well as a fit midfield enforcer who could provide a good foil for Steven N’Zonzi. The squad considered Christopher Samba, Phil Jones, Martin Olsson, N’Zonzi, Junior Hoilett, and Niko Kalinic as among its sell-able assets.
This is now… (Playing Squad on February 8, 2013)
The current squad is much thinner at center back and still lacks a strong central midfield partnership. However, what it has gained is a top quality finisher in Jordan Rhodes. The make-up of the squad can be described as hard-working, robust and solid at best. Whilst players in the initial squad moved on for 8 digit fees in a couple of the cases, it is hard to see anyone being sold for anything near that fee, with the exception of Jordan Rhodes who, at the very least, should fetch the same fee he joined the club under. Other than Rhodes, and possibly Scott Dann, largely due to him being English, it is difficult to see anyone fetching more than £5 million from the current squad. Martin Olsson, who was once rated in the £6m-£7m bracket could now cost buyers a more realistic £4m fee at the end of the season.
Who They Bought
By December 2011, Rovers were at the crossroads where the upcoming transfer window, at the time, would have played a crucial role in the club staying up or getting relegated. Most of the transfers under Venkys had not panned out well until that period and the pressure was on to get it right that time around. However, as history is testament, Venkys took the cautious route and did not undertake the sort of spending that they would commission in the next transfer window. They would also let go of both Christopher Samba and a fully fit Ryan Nelsen.
In the overall scheme of things, the owners have overseen the acquisition of 25 players up till and including the January 2013 transfer window. They have “spent” over £34 million on those transfers, and this does not include an exorbitant amount on agent fees, namely during the first two transfer windows of their tenure. In some cases, the agent fees dwarfed the transfer fee in question. Dann and Rhodes were the most expensive signings on the list with nine of the signings being made on free transfers.
Looking at the list above, it is difficult to judge how many of those transfers have turned out to be a success. If the assessment had to be done today then other than Yakubu and Rhodes, it is difficult to call any other transfer a success. Ruben Rochina may prove to be a success down the line or at the very least may be sold for more money than he joined the club under the owners, which would make it a first for Venkys. Scott Dann has improved this season but Rovers are mid-table in the Championship and its difficult to suggest that his performances will ever attract the sort of interest that he had been allegedly receiving for a period of his career at Birmingham. Back to back relegation campaigns do not read well on the center back’s CV.
Interestingly, 10 of the players that they had brought into the club are no longer with with it today. That is a staggering 40% of the transfers.
Almost the same number of players have left the club under Venkys reign as had joined them. If one had to form two starting line-ups out of the two lists and pit them against each other it would see the likes of Bunn, Salgado, Samba, Nelsen, Emerton – Diouf, Jones, N’Zonzi, Hoilett – Yakubu, Kalinic representing the players who were sold, take on a team including Bruno Ribeiro, Dann, Nuno Henrique, Orr – Formica, Murphy, Etuhu, Markus Olsson – Rochina, and Rhodes. Venkys have yet to sign a goalkeeper on a permanent contract, with Pole Sandomiercki having joined the club on loan in the summer of 2012.
Needless to say the quality present in the list of exodus is clear for all to see. A number of the players formed the backbones of Rovers sides over the previous 4-5 seasons prior to Venkys ownership.
The first striking item off the list is the fact that despite statements stating Venkys have spent money and have shown their commitment to the cause in recent times, they have made more money from transfers than they have spent (not including agent fees, wages and compensation agreements to release players). A second striking element is the fact that some of the players that had been present in the list of transfers into the club also feature here. Four players have been bought and sold by Venkys during their tenure and all for a loss (not including Myles Anderson who joined and left on free transfers). Radosav Petrovic, Simon Vukcevic and Yakubu joined the club for a combined fee of at least £5.5m but left the club for a fee thought to be £1.5m in total as well as a compensation package to get one of them off the club’s payroll. Nothing illustrates failure in transfer dealings more than the fact that Rovers, under Venkys, have gotten rid of many of the same players they have brought in. The list does not even include players who have been sent out on loan. This brings us to the next section of the analysis.
Here Today, Gone Tomorrow
Throughout the article it has become apparent that Venkys have admitted failure in a number of their transfer dealings through the exit of the same players virtually as soon as they’d joined the club. A total of 12 out of the 25 players that they signed have left the club either on loan or a full transfer. Let’s not forget that two of the 25 players only joined the club during the last two weeks, and this effectively means that more than half of the players brought into the club have gone on to leave the club in the period in question.
The list below provides some riveting realities.
The players at the top of the table have survived – till date – the revolving doors at Ewood Park. From the rest, Ruben Rochina’s stay was the longest. He completed exactly 2 years as a Rovers player before being shipped out, surprisingly, to Real Zaragoza. Argentine Mauro Formica was 8 days short of his two year anniversary as well. Diogo Rosado only remained for 153 days before being given away on loan to Benfica’s B side for the rest of the season. He appeared twice in Rovers colors in the Championship. That’s twice as much as Jordan Slew or Paulo Jorge have ever put on the shirt. Myles Anderson remained at the club for 411 consecutive days without making a single appearance before being shipped out on loan to Aldershot. Bruno Ribeiro appeared once almost every 100 days before leaving on loan back to Brazil. The numbers prove hard to take for Rovers faithful.
It is difficult for any un-biased person to assess the facts presented above and draw any other conclusion than that Venkys transfer policy has been a complete and utter failure. As owners, you’d be assessed on your general running of club, choice of managers, patience, transfer policy as well as success during your tenure. This article wanted to assess one cornerstone of the above in isolation of the others. Theoretically, what would make for a successful transfer policy?
Firstly, one would assess the quality of the squad at a said time and compare it to the one that exists after a set period. In the case of Venkys, the squad looks weaker, on paper, than it was at the time they took over. The balance of the squad is different with some gaps filled whilst others expanded compared to the squad they inherited. The Jordan Rhodes transfer proves to be the one undoubted masterstroke of their reign, even though he joined for a bloated fee of £8 million. The fact that he is young, and British coupled with the transfer fees being paid for British players in the current era (see Steven Fletcher as an example) mean that barring a horrendous injury or a complete 180 degree turn-around in his fortunes on the pitch, Rhodes will leave Rovers for at least the same fee he joined the club under.
Secondly, one would analyze the assets or potential assets a club brings in on the playing front. Venkys brought in a number of young players with a view towards building a side for the future and selling its components on for a profit, or at least that’s what the owners publicly said at the time in late-2010. However, a number of those same players have already moved on and not after having their careers flourish at Rovers. In fact, one could argue that for many of those young hopefuls their careers stalled at Rovers, either through not performing at an adequate level or by the fact that they were not given enough opportunities or the environment to build upon.
Thirdly, one would assess the value of the squad. Looking at the current squad, it is difficult to see how more than £15m would be raised through the sale of the whole first team squad not including Rhodes. Phil Jones was sold for more than that figure. That puts things into perspective.
In a nutshell, it is difficult to find any case for optimism for the owners overall transfer policy. It is interesting that over the four transfer windows that they have been in charge of, they’ve had a number of different people pulling the strings on the ins and outs at the club but the overall results have all been less than acceptable. If their choice of managers has proven to provide the catalyst for Rovers slide towards mid-table obscurity in the Championship, then their transfer policy has provided the long-term back-drop in devaluing and weakening the squad to the point that it arguably belongs where it currently is.
Many analysts considered Rovers squad to be the best in the Championship before a ball was kicked in the summer of 2012. The players undoubtedly under-performed but it still did not change that fact. However, today, it is difficult to hold that point of view any longer. Rovers current squad does not look like anything more than just another average Championship squad that is being carried by the goals of one exceptional player in Jordan Rhodes. If those goals somehow push Rovers back into the Premier League again by the end of May, then Venkys may get another chance to remedy their transfer policy. But if history is a lesson, then one thing is for sure and that is Venkys do not learn from their mistakes as much or as quickly as it is needed in the business of football.